4 ms·
That's what I assumed (but I wondered if there was some other advantage I was missing). Are not all the ciphers breakable post collection anyways? Is it fair t
by hurin 12y ago
That's what I assumed (but I wondered if there was some other advantage I was missing).
Are not all the ciphers breakable post collection anyways? Is it fair to say that this is effectively for the purpose of blanket non-targeted surveillance?
Where by having the keys in their possession it gives them a shortcut for bulk analysis and saving CPU time that would otherwise be spent breaking encryption.
And a cpu-processing-savings advantage justified cyber-attacking a foreign civilian corporation?
- rkangel 12y agoWith the keys, you can do data collection now, and cracking later. You can do mass interceptions and then decide which calls you want to look at.
- hurin 12y ago>With the keys, you can do data collection now, and cracking later. Do the attacks on A5/1 require known plaintext? I was under the impression that they do not.
- BuildTheRobots 12y agoMy understanding was that the A5/1 attack (and massive rainbow table) not only relies on known plaintext but also requires you to get the _start_ of the communication.