3 ms·
There's lots of good reasons to not use H(m || k) -- I'm not going to argue with you there. I just don't want people to say "oh my god, Nate says that what I'm
by cperciva 17y ago
There's lots of good reasons to not use H(m || k) -- I'm not going to argue with you there.
I just don't want people to say "oh my god, Nate says that what I'm doing is insecure, I'd better fix it ASAP" -- and possibly introduce far worse problems in their panic -- if what they're doing is dumb but not necessarily insecure... hence my pointing out that the insecurity of H(m || k) depends on whether the hash function is broken.
- tptacek 17y agoSo basically you're saying that if they're using SHA-256 H(m||k), they shouldn't worry, and you want to make that clear. I'll tell you what: I bet you $50 that we can find 5 examples of H(m || k) MACs on Google code search, and that none of them will use an "acceptably" secure hash function. I'd really like to bet that you simply will - not - be - able - to - find an H(m || k) MAC that uses a hash function that is survivable in that configuration, but proving that would take too long. I think I can win that other bet inside of an hour. If there are no real-world systems that could possibly be secure in the H(m || k) configuration, I'm left wondering why you're sticking up for it, other than to be pedantic. Being pedantic about security on Hacker News is my job, Colin, not yours. I know you feel like you're just being academically precise in this conversation, but what you're really doing is creating a subtext that SHA1 is survivable in H(m || k) configurations, and that this is really just an example of "how broken MD5 is".