>Browser vendors need to rethink the mostly blind eye they've been turning toward corporate DPI and silent MITM. This kind of inspection is becoming more and m

>Browser vendors need to rethink the mostly blind eye they've been turning toward corporate DPI and silent MITM. This kind of inspection is becoming more and more important for companies with every very public and expensive hack that occurs. Google, Microsoft and Apple all produce closed source software that they do not want leaked. They all have secrets and embarrassing private issues that have happened. I doubt you'll see cooperation from them in removing the ability to inspect traffic that leaves their networks or machines. >Firefox is still one of the hardest-to-configure parts of the software for non-technical users I'd agree that it's difficult for a non-technical user to configure, but that lack of easier configurability is a sign that Mozilla isn't really beholden to these organizations. If they were they'd just use the standard OS CA certificate stores like Safari, Chrome and Internet Explorer do. >There may be a legal difference between corporate DPI and Privdog, but we should stop pretending that there's a huge technical or ethical distinction between Privdog and browser vendors turning a blind eye to silent DPI against someone who does not get a say in it, and often does not even know about it. I agree, but I also recognize the importance of this feature to companies, big or small. While Chrome and Internet Explorer both have consumer and enterprise versions/configurations for their browsers, they could split security features with the user in mind too. I'd say Safari could do more in general but I feel like Apple has such a love/hate relationship with enterprise customers that it would be hit or miss in execution.