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>The patent system is actually highly problematic because it a) provides no reward for research leading to negative results (which is extremely important to sci

>The patent system is actually highly problematic because it a) provides no reward for research leading to negative results (which is extremely important to scientific progress)... And how is that different from absolutely any known system for managing science? You don't get publications for failed results either. FWIW I dedicated a whole quarter of my Master's thesis to a failed approach, just because I also thought it was important for progress, even though it provided little value from a thesis defense perspective >and b) provides the money after the fact rather than while the research is being conducted, requiring scientists to solicit investors up front (and possibly not be able to find any) Again, sounds like how the current proposal-for-grant system we have now. > and then gives the fruits to investors who may or may not reinvest it into future R&D. There really is no way to differentiate this from the alternatives. The government decides to invest based on a budget that is subject to way more conflicting forces than a profit-driven private entity. > Then on top of that the patent monopoly makes the new invention more expensive ... That is a commonly postulated hypothesis, but if one looks at empirical evidence, one finds a great deal of positive impetus to innovation provided by patents... in some industries. As always, the data is messy, the situations are complex, and the hypotheses are simplistic, but a large number of studies show that the patent system has significant benefits as well as costs. However it is impossible to tell from the data which one outweighs the other, mainly because it is like comparing apples and oranges. In general, though, risky, capital intensive fields are benefited more than harmed by patents. >* massive direct public funding of scientific research.* I don't know what you mean by "public", but to me it sounds like "government", in which case, see point above regarding budgets.

sokoloff 12y ago
I read a "negative result" as different from a "failed result". A negative result, which has scientific value but no patent value, would be something like, "We have conclusively shown that blood-letting by leeches is not an effective treatment for fever." A failed result, on the other hand, would read more like "We were unable to conclusively determine one way or the other, but here's the method we used" You could certainly publish the former (back in a time where that wasn't already accepted fact in the scientific/medical community), but it's unclear how you'd apply that to the patent (or even market) realm. You can't patent "stopping doing something".
eli_gottlieb 12y ago
I think this problem could be solved with relative simplicity: partially nationalize all patents based on publicly-funded research. The state becomes entitled to a percentage of royalties from the commercial fruits of all such research, and in return, it offers uniform percentage-based licensing terms to all comers. In one sweep, we capture some of the value of publicly-funded science for publicly-funded science, and we get rid of patent trolls, and we strongly reduce the intellectual-property risk of building a product based on others' research.

sokoloff 12y ago

I read a "negative result" as different from a "failed result". A negative result, which has scientific value but no patent value, would be something like, "We have conclusively shown that blood-letting by leeches is not an effective treatment for fever." A failed result, on the other hand, would read more like "We were unable to conclusively determine one way or the other, but here's the method we used" You could certainly publish the former (back in a time where that wasn't already accepted fact in the scientific/medical community), but it's unclear how you'd apply that to the patent (or even market) realm. You can't patent "stopping doing something".

eli_gottlieb 12y ago

I think this problem could be solved with relative simplicity: partially nationalize all patents based on publicly-funded research. The state becomes entitled to a percentage of royalties from the commercial fruits of all such research, and in return, it offers uniform percentage-based licensing terms to all comers. In one sweep, we capture some of the value of publicly-funded science for publicly-funded science, and we get rid of patent trolls, and we strongly reduce the intellectual-property risk of building a product based on others' research.