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This article wasn't talking about Boomers, like the Ohio Class, which can go hide in the middle of the ocean, but attack class submarines, which need to get up

This article wasn't talking about Boomers, like the Ohio Class, which can go hide in the middle of the ocean, but attack class submarines, which need to get up close to their target. The theory is that with more advanced detection technology, you can blanket an small area with sensors, and deny that small area to an attack submarine. This has no implications for MAD.

brudgers 12y ago
To extend this, the US attack submarine has seen mission creep from suppressing the opponent's missile submarine; directly engaging the opponent's attack submarines to protect friendly boomers; and harrying the opponent's capital naval and merchant fleets. With the end of the Cold War, US attack submarines have been increasingly deployed out of blue-water roles for which they are truly suited. Industrial inertia more than increasing opponent capability has been the driving force behind continued maintenance of a substantial attack submarine fleet via the development of replacements for the Los Angeles class...somehow the reduction in boomers to hunt for didn't mean significantly fewer attack submarines and there are more in service now than at the turn of the millennium.
- hga 12y ago
  I've always considered them to be a "trump-card" against any developments that negate surface craft. Suppose in a future "Battle of the Taiwan Straight" the PRC makes it sufficiently unhealthy that our carriers can't support the ROC? And things are marginal for the destroyers we can spare? If they can't also negate the attack subs.... I would cut the carrier force before I'd cut the attack subs.
  - brudgers 12y ago
    At the danger of starting something political, I don't think the US can win a war with China in the Taiwan straight regardless of fleet composition. China is not Iraq in terms of signals intelligence, electronic warfare capability, and nuclear arsenal. Never mind financial and political wherewithal. The Chinese were more than a match sixty years ago to the point that MacArthur was fired over wanting to go hot with the nukes. Their strength relative to that of the US has only increased in the interim. In addition the US's interests are less aligned with those of 中國國民黨 with each passing year. The Koumintang lost the civil war and communism has been replaced by other bogeymen. The reality is that the US is at best in position to broker a reasonably peaceful solution along the lines of the British transfer of Hong Kong.
    - hga 12y ago
      Against the US of that time (Truman disamement resulted in the military buying back "surplus" recently sold), the US Army of that time (read the chapter "Proud Legions" in This Kind of War), against one of the most overrated generals in US history ... they "were more than a match". So were the North Koreans prior to Ridgway taking command of the 8th Army and e.g. our cracking the problem of the KPA's T-34s. The Marines, on the other hand, hadn't devolved like the Army, and their story was very different. Even then, with the PRC entering the war rather late in the game, the total for the war kill ratios were 1-3 in our favor. The ability of the ROC and the US to win such a modern battle of the Taiwan Straights depends on too many unknowns for us to make any solid predictions right now. How much of Taiwan is the PRC willing to destroy to capture it? Can a clever attack by air avoid the "million man swim"? Will we even have enough time to mobilize, or would it be a a Bolt Out Of the Blue attack? Would they even try if the new PRC leadership starts failing hard on the mainland? Or might that prompt them to try, but perhaps badly? Would we even try if Obama was still President? As for "a reasonably peaceful solution", I don't see that even being a possibility with the new leadership's program of repression.

brudgers 12y ago

To extend this, the US attack submarine has seen mission creep from suppressing the opponent's missile submarine; directly engaging the opponent's attack submarines to protect friendly boomers; and harrying the opponent's capital naval and merchant fleets. With the end of the Cold War, US attack submarines have been increasingly deployed out of blue-water roles for which they are truly suited. Industrial inertia more than increasing opponent capability has been the driving force behind continued maintenance of a substantial attack submarine fleet via the development of replacements for the Los Angeles class...somehow the reduction in boomers to hunt for didn't mean significantly fewer attack submarines and there are more in service now than at the turn of the millennium.

hga 12y ago
I've always considered them to be a "trump-card" against any developments that negate surface craft. Suppose in a future "Battle of the Taiwan Straight" the PRC makes it sufficiently unhealthy that our carriers can't support the ROC? And things are marginal for the destroyers we can spare? If they can't also negate the attack subs.... I would cut the carrier force before I'd cut the attack subs.
- brudgers 12y ago
  At the danger of starting something political, I don't think the US can win a war with China in the Taiwan straight regardless of fleet composition. China is not Iraq in terms of signals intelligence, electronic warfare capability, and nuclear arsenal. Never mind financial and political wherewithal. The Chinese were more than a match sixty years ago to the point that MacArthur was fired over wanting to go hot with the nukes. Their strength relative to that of the US has only increased in the interim. In addition the US's interests are less aligned with those of 中國國民黨 with each passing year. The Koumintang lost the civil war and communism has been replaced by other bogeymen. The reality is that the US is at best in position to broker a reasonably peaceful solution along the lines of the British transfer of Hong Kong.
  - hga 12y ago
    Against the US of that time (Truman disamement resulted in the military buying back "surplus" recently sold), the US Army of that time (read the chapter "Proud Legions" in This Kind of War), against one of the most overrated generals in US history ... they "were more than a match". So were the North Koreans prior to Ridgway taking command of the 8th Army and e.g. our cracking the problem of the KPA's T-34s. The Marines, on the other hand, hadn't devolved like the Army, and their story was very different. Even then, with the PRC entering the war rather late in the game, the total for the war kill ratios were 1-3 in our favor. The ability of the ROC and the US to win such a modern battle of the Taiwan Straights depends on too many unknowns for us to make any solid predictions right now. How much of Taiwan is the PRC willing to destroy to capture it? Can a clever attack by air avoid the "million man swim"? Will we even have enough time to mobilize, or would it be a a Bolt Out Of the Blue attack? Would they even try if the new PRC leadership starts failing hard on the mainland? Or might that prompt them to try, but perhaps badly? Would we even try if Obama was still President? As for "a reasonably peaceful solution", I don't see that even being a possibility with the new leadership's program of repression.