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Obsolete sounds a little strong. The denied areas for submarine operations will get larger, but the ocean is really big. Running the fixed and mobile sensor arr

by rbc 12y ago

Obsolete sounds a little strong. The denied areas for submarine operations will get larger, but the ocean is really big. Running the fixed and mobile sensor arrays to detect submarines is not cheap. Regardless of the foreseeable improvements in submarine detection, they'll still be harder to find than surface ships.

pm90 12y ago
Absolutely. Case in point: the missing Malaysian airplane is yet to be found.
- lettergram 12y ago
  That even had a transmitter, and wasn't designed to be difficult to find.
fnordfnordfnord 12y ago
Right, but if they have to launch from the middle of the ocean, their advantage over ICBM's becomes much smaller, maybe none if they can't strike & destroy hostile C&C and launch sites. It is already a very small window of time that boomers are most useful for in a hot war. SLBM's utility in peacetime/pre-war is contingent upon people not knowing where they are. OTOH, relying on ICMB's is contingent on enough people at SAC being sober, which may not be a safe bet.
- dimitar 12y ago
  Nuclear ballistic missile-armed submarines are considered second strike weapons, even though there are first strike scenarios for their use. Their missiles don't have the range to hit launch sites that are far inland in North America or Eurasia. Even if they did the missiles would be vulnerable to anti defence. Additionally they are slow moving, which is very undesirable in first strikes. However they can get really close to major population centers near the oceans and kill millions. Thus second-strike forces are supposed to act as deterrence. Area denial can make them much less effective if combined with proper air defence to take down the missiles.
  - cocoablazing 12y ago
    What is your reference for this range assertion? OS intelligence says that US SLBM's can strike any target in Eurasia from either ocean. What is your reference for the assertion that Trident is vulnerable to ABM? RF has no operational ABM system capable of striking RB's entering at 8 km/s. Why do submarines have to move quickly to enable a first strike? Can't they just stealthily move into the exact position necessary days prior to launch? You should review what public data is available on Trident testing, because it contradicts every one of your assertions. The Trident equipment section has been observed conducting 14 distinct warhead release maneuvers in space. The largest warhead Trident can carry is estimated to have a 500kt yield. Trident is estimated to carry a max loadout to >7e3 km, and a reduced (treaty) loadout to >11e3km. It is also estimated to exhibit the precision necessary to guarantee kills against the latest Russian silos (envelop the silo structure within the earthen blast cavity). This means that the Trident fleet can strike and neutralize every counter-force target in Eurasia from defended waters. There is no "proper air defence to take down the missiles" in existence, and there is no indication that current ABM programs have any hope of defeating a MIRV'd fleet of solid fuel launchers.
  - desdiv 12y ago
    Their missiles don't have the range to hit launch sites that are far inland in North America or Eurasia. You're severely underestimating the range of SLBMs. The Russian RSM-56 can cover the entire continental US from both Saint Petersburg and Vladivostok.
  - tsotha 12y ago
    >Their missiles don't have the range to hit launch sites that are far inland in North America or Eurasia. This is just wrong. We're talking about ballistic missiles here, not cruise missiles. There isn't a spot on the face of the earth that can't be nuked by a sub from a safe distance. >Even if they did the missiles would be vulnerable to anti defence. Also mostly wrong. Only a handful of countries have any defense at all against an IRBM, those defenses only cover a tiny portion of their respective territory, and are both unreliable and relatively easily defeated. >Additionally they are slow moving, which is very undesirable in first strikes. Why? If I launch a missile hundreds of miles from enemy ships they're not going to find me. The only thing I have to worry about is a nuclear response, which is a hazard for any platform conducting a first strike. >However they can get really close to major population centers near the oceans and kill millions. If by "close" you mean 4000 miles. I guess it's a relative term. >Area denial can make them much less effective if combined with proper air defence to take down the missiles. Air defense that wasn't specifically designed to take down ballistic missiles won't have any effect at all. You're confusing ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. The former are an order of magnitude more difficult to deal with from a planning perspective.
- vonmoltke 12y ago
  I think both you and dimtar are confusing SLBMs with cruise missiles. The Trident II has a range of over 4000nm, only half the Minuteman III ICBM's range, with a similar flight profile to the ICBM. SSBNs have a significant advantage in that they are mobile and to some degree hidden. A first strike can target ICBM launch facilities and effectively neutralize them, meaning those birds either fly when the balloon goes up or they don't fly at all. SSBNs have to be hunted down and destroyed individually. This provides a retaliation capability that cannot easily be destroyed by a massive first strike. They are "second strike" in the sense that they will be available to respond to any nuclear attack, no matter how overwhelming, thus ensuring MAD remains an effective deterrent to nuclear weapons use.
- InclinedPlane 12y ago
  Huh? The advantage of SLBMs is that they are enormously survivable. It doesn't matter where they are as long as they can't be taken out in a first strike, so they provide robust, highly credible retaliatory strike capability at all times. Modern SLBMs have more than enough range to maintain that from the middle of the ocean.
  - fnordfnordfnord 12y ago
    >The advantage of SLBMs is that they are enormously survivable. Right but their survivability is contingent upon their not being detected.
topkai22 12y ago
Original report is located at http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/01/undersea-warfare/ http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/01/undersea-warfare/. Much more informative than the national interest article. Obsolete is definitely a little strong- the original report leans toward area denial for littoral operations and says nothing about almost nothing about Boomers. The evolution of the submarine to an underwater mothership with UUV and other components is well underway, especially for littoral operaitons- see, for example the cancelled http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_SEAL_Delivery_System http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_SEAL_Delivery_System.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
Shivetya 12y ago
Considering we cannot find a modern airliner that crashed into the sea I really doubt submarines will be all that threatened until a means to see through the atmosphere and sea is derived for satellites. The real means to obsoleting boomers and other weaponized menaces is to create a world where the consumerism dominates any nation with sufficient means to go to war. Simply put, their population will demand everything but war. The only threat to that is sliding backwards from a consumer driven economy to a state driven one like Russia is experiencing.

by rbc 12y ago

pm90 12y ago

Absolutely. Case in point: the missing Malaysian airplane is yet to be found.

lettergram 12y ago
That even had a transmitter, and wasn't designed to be difficult to find.

fnordfnordfnord 12y ago

Right, but if they have to launch from the middle of the ocean, their advantage over ICBM's becomes much smaller, maybe none if they can't strike & destroy hostile C&C and launch sites. It is already a very small window of time that boomers are most useful for in a hot war. SLBM's utility in peacetime/pre-war is contingent upon people not knowing where they are. OTOH, relying on ICMB's is contingent on enough people at SAC being sober, which may not be a safe bet.

dimitar 12y ago
Nuclear ballistic missile-armed submarines are considered second strike weapons, even though there are first strike scenarios for their use. Their missiles don't have the range to hit launch sites that are far inland in North America or Eurasia. Even if they did the missiles would be vulnerable to anti defence. Additionally they are slow moving, which is very undesirable in first strikes. However they can get really close to major population centers near the oceans and kill millions. Thus second-strike forces are supposed to act as deterrence. Area denial can make them much less effective if combined with proper air defence to take down the missiles.
- cocoablazing 12y ago
  What is your reference for this range assertion? OS intelligence says that US SLBM's can strike any target in Eurasia from either ocean. What is your reference for the assertion that Trident is vulnerable to ABM? RF has no operational ABM system capable of striking RB's entering at 8 km/s. Why do submarines have to move quickly to enable a first strike? Can't they just stealthily move into the exact position necessary days prior to launch? You should review what public data is available on Trident testing, because it contradicts every one of your assertions. The Trident equipment section has been observed conducting 14 distinct warhead release maneuvers in space. The largest warhead Trident can carry is estimated to have a 500kt yield. Trident is estimated to carry a max loadout to >7e3 km, and a reduced (treaty) loadout to >11e3km. It is also estimated to exhibit the precision necessary to guarantee kills against the latest Russian silos (envelop the silo structure within the earthen blast cavity). This means that the Trident fleet can strike and neutralize every counter-force target in Eurasia from defended waters. There is no "proper air defence to take down the missiles" in existence, and there is no indication that current ABM programs have any hope of defeating a MIRV'd fleet of solid fuel launchers.
- desdiv 12y ago
  Their missiles don't have the range to hit launch sites that are far inland in North America or Eurasia. You're severely underestimating the range of SLBMs. The Russian RSM-56 can cover the entire continental US from both Saint Petersburg and Vladivostok.
- tsotha 12y ago
  >Their missiles don't have the range to hit launch sites that are far inland in North America or Eurasia. This is just wrong. We're talking about ballistic missiles here, not cruise missiles. There isn't a spot on the face of the earth that can't be nuked by a sub from a safe distance. >Even if they did the missiles would be vulnerable to anti defence. Also mostly wrong. Only a handful of countries have any defense at all against an IRBM, those defenses only cover a tiny portion of their respective territory, and are both unreliable and relatively easily defeated. >Additionally they are slow moving, which is very undesirable in first strikes. Why? If I launch a missile hundreds of miles from enemy ships they're not going to find me. The only thing I have to worry about is a nuclear response, which is a hazard for any platform conducting a first strike. >However they can get really close to major population centers near the oceans and kill millions. If by "close" you mean 4000 miles. I guess it's a relative term. >Area denial can make them much less effective if combined with proper air defence to take down the missiles. Air defense that wasn't specifically designed to take down ballistic missiles won't have any effect at all. You're confusing ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. The former are an order of magnitude more difficult to deal with from a planning perspective.
vonmoltke 12y ago
I think both you and dimtar are confusing SLBMs with cruise missiles. The Trident II has a range of over 4000nm, only half the Minuteman III ICBM's range, with a similar flight profile to the ICBM. SSBNs have a significant advantage in that they are mobile and to some degree hidden. A first strike can target ICBM launch facilities and effectively neutralize them, meaning those birds either fly when the balloon goes up or they don't fly at all. SSBNs have to be hunted down and destroyed individually. This provides a retaliation capability that cannot easily be destroyed by a massive first strike. They are "second strike" in the sense that they will be available to respond to any nuclear attack, no matter how overwhelming, thus ensuring MAD remains an effective deterrent to nuclear weapons use.
InclinedPlane 12y ago
Huh? The advantage of SLBMs is that they are enormously survivable. It doesn't matter where they are as long as they can't be taken out in a first strike, so they provide robust, highly credible retaliatory strike capability at all times. Modern SLBMs have more than enough range to maintain that from the middle of the ocean.
- fnordfnordfnord 12y ago
  >The advantage of SLBMs is that they are enormously survivable. Right but their survivability is contingent upon their not being detected.

topkai22 12y ago

Original report is located at http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/01/undersea-warfare/ http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/01/undersea-warfare/. Much more informative than the national interest article. Obsolete is definitely a little strong- the original report leans toward area denial for littoral operations and says nothing about almost nothing about Boomers. The evolution of the submarine to an underwater mothership with UUV and other components is well underway, especially for littoral operaitons- see, for example the cancelled http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_SEAL_Delivery_System http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_SEAL_Delivery_System.

deleted 12y ago
[deleted]

Shivetya 12y ago

Considering we cannot find a modern airliner that crashed into the sea I really doubt submarines will be all that threatened until a means to see through the atmosphere and sea is derived for satellites. The real means to obsoleting boomers and other weaponized menaces is to create a world where the consumerism dominates any nation with sufficient means to go to war. Simply put, their population will demand everything but war. The only threat to that is sliding backwards from a consumer driven economy to a state driven one like Russia is experiencing.