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Is it good or bad that they made no attempt at all to obfuscate the cert and password? I mean, obviously this whole stupid MitM attempt is stupid, but by leavin
by jessaustin 12y ago
Is it good or bad that they made no attempt at all to obfuscate the cert and password? I mean, obviously this whole stupid MitM attempt is stupid, but by leaving this stuff totally in the clear, can they claim to have done all this out of stupidity rather than out of a callous disregard for the security of their customers?
- xnyhps 12y agoThey added a password to the private key which they didn't have to, so it's not true that they didn't attempt to obfuscate it at all. In practice that only bought them a couple of hours at most, but why add a password unless you're trying to stop people from using it?
- spacefight 12y agoThey didn't "buy hours" - they didn't really have a defense line there. They cashed in the day they signed the contract with Lenovo. Someone should sue to see these contracts open in the public.
- mikeash 12y agoIf you subscribe to the idea that you shouldn't assume malice when stupidity suffices, maybe the programmer in question just saw somewhere that it's good practice to use a password on private keys, and didn't understand why you do it or how it helps.
- jessaustin 12y agoYeah that's another point for the "don't blame us because we're stupid" argument. They're actually so stupid that they use a password, that's stored in the same place as the cert. If they used any of the standard anti-reversing techniques, that would have implied enough sophistication to be expected to know how TLS certs work, thus enough sophistication to know to just generate new certs on first use. One would have expected Commodea to make this automatic for their poor stupid customers, however.
- xnyhps 12y agoLooks like the software they were using indeed requires a password on the private key: http://www.komodia.com/wiki/index.php/Komodia%27s_Redirector_API_Guide#Flags http://www.komodia.com/wiki/index.php/Komodia%27s_Redirector... (Down near the bottom, "sslpsd - To the password of the root CA (it's mandatory).")
- qzw 12y agoThe implementation may be mostly stupidity/laziness as they probably just used Komodia's ad injection SDK: http://www.komodia.com/ad-injection-sdk/ http://www.komodia.com/ad-injection-sdk/ But if you look at what Komodia says on that page regarding anti-virus: "The SDK has anti virus capabilities and each compiled version generates a totally new version." it's pretty clear they know this is something that most people would consider to be malware rather than just run of the mill adware. So the blatant disregard for users appears pretty malicious.
- murbard2 12y agoUseless. What would have been valuable would have been to generate a random private key at installation time. As it stands, it seems like the private key extracted can be used to mitm all Lenovo users.
- danielweber 12y agoYes. There are a bunch of legit proxies that do this already, and they know that when they mess with SSL they need to be careful.
- chinathrow 12y agoLegit? Care to elaborate? I am really interested.
- guscost 12y agoDebugging proxies like Fiddler (Windows) or Charles (Mac) generate a certificate if you want to inspect HTTPS.
- userbinator 12y agoSome ad-removing proxies (basically the exact opposite of Superfish?) and antivirus need to do MITM on SSL as otherwise they would be completely ineffective against ads or malware served via SSL.
- sillysaurus3 12y agoIs it true that an antivirus program like Microsoft Security Essentials installs a cert into the system cert store in order to MITM all network traffic?
- barrkel 12y agoNo. Some != all.
- 12y ago
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- brohee 12y agoIt was obfuscated. The "product" uses an obfuscating executable packer. It was extracted from a memory dump not from reversing the program.