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It doesn't seem unreasonable that the NSA working in conjunction with the CIA could place moles in various high tech firms of interest and thus obtain all the s
by taylodl 12y ago
It doesn't seem unreasonable that the NSA working in conjunction with the CIA could place moles in various high tech firms of interest and thus obtain all the source. Following this to its logical conclusion then it's not unreasonable to assume the NSA has the source to most firmware and operating systems in use today.
What the article doesn't reveal is the attack vector, how did the firmware in these drives come to be infected?
- junto 12y agoWhat the article doesn't reveal is the attack vector, how did the firmware in these drives come to be infected? Worst case scenario; They all are infected as they come out of the factory. Best case, they are rerouted and patched during postal delivery by a targeted ops team.
- sp332 12y agoMedium case: The NSA has a slate of exploits that lets them target malware installation on specific machines. Edit: are downvotes because you don't think it's "medium", or implausible, or what?
- adekok 12y ago> What the article doesn't reveal is the attack vector, how did the firmware in these drives come to be infected? If criminals can target a bank to steal $300M from clients, the NSA can target a HD company to steal the source code. It's really not that difficult. Remember, the best attack isn't a direct assault. It's a sneak assault. The story is that during WWII, Ian Fleming was part of a group of spies in training, who were asked to get into a secure nuclear research facility. Everyone else got caught. Sneaking in under the wire, etc. Ian called a professor friend to vouch for him. Then, call the facility, and asked for a tour, as a visiting "researcher". After the tour was over, he called his boss, and told them his briefcase was hidden next to a critical part of the facility. Bugging HD firmware is a brilliant ploy. Who looks there?
- sesqu 12y agoThere is no need to steal the source code. As mentioned in the article (or a different article?), they can just demand the manufacturer send the source code for NSA review before the government buys any drives.
- a3n 12y agoWhile reading the article, I had to wonder how it must feel to be management at a HDD manufacturer today, and look out over the desks or think back over the contractors, and wonder which one is the spy.
- grey-area 12y agoThey do physically intercept some hardware, so that's one vector: http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/12/glenn-greenwald-nsa-tampers-us-internet-routers-snowden http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/12/glenn-greenwald... Alternatively could they use software exploits in an OS to execute arbitrary code and rewrite the firmware?
- mschuster91 12y agoWhy use software exploits? Just use an ordinary privilege escalation and act like the firmware upgrade tool of the manufacturer.
- kalleboo 12y ago> What the article doesn't reveal is the attack vector, how did the firmware in these drives come to be infected? http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2015/Equation-Group-The-Crown-Creator-of-Cyber-Espionage http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2015/Equation-Grou... Classic spying methods to deliver malware The attackers used universal methods to infect targets: not only through the web, but also in the physical world. For that they used an interdiction technique – intercepting physical goods and replacing them with Trojanized versions. One such example involved targeting participants at a scientific conference in Houston: upon returning home, some of the participants received a copy of the conference materials on a CD-ROM which was then used to install the group’s DoubleFantasy implant into the target’s machine. The exact method by which these CDs were interdicted is unknown.