4 ms·
How, precisely, does one store a decryption key on the CPU for longer than the duration of the programming running (and never have it swapped out to RAM when ma
by falcolas 12y ago
How, precisely, does one store a decryption key on the CPU for longer than the duration of the programming running (and never have it swapped out to RAM when making syscalls and handling interrupts, to boot)? Plus, where is the decrypted instruction stored? IP typically points at some place in memory. Not to mention the many different VMs which would let you pull the values of registers right from the virtual CPUs. HARE brained scheme indeed.
- allemagne 12y agoCouldn't they just store keys and decrypt instructions using something like a Trusted Platform Module?
- AnthonyMouse 12y agoThere are a couple of problems with that. The first is that many devices don't have a TPM and there is no point in bothering if using it is optional. The second, and this is the one that kills half the stuff people think a TPM would be good for, is that it assumes every TPM implementation everywhere is secure. Reverse engineer finds one device with one vulnerability and you lose. Someone who finds a vulnerability doesn't even need to disclose what it is so you can fix it, they just start selling TPM keys for Bitcoin that anyone can use to emulate a device with a TPM.
- MichaelGG 12y agoTPMs have already been broken, Christopher Tarnovsky showed that for some Infineon TPM. I find it suspect that Lenovo, for instance, is making sure they have truly hardened TPMs. Even dedicated HSMs like the Chrysalis Luna CA3 (I own one) have been broken: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf
- pstrateman 12y agoThere's a number of techniques. Mostly they have to do with abusing the debug registers. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRESOR http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRESOR I cant find any specifics for this implementation though. https://www.syscan.org/index.php/sg/speakerlist https://www.syscan.org/index.php/sg/speakerlist
- groby_b 12y agoIt's indeed TRESOR-based. See http://opencfp.immunityinc.com/talks/64/ http://opencfp.immunityinc.com/talks/64/
- falcolas 12y agoTRESOR would rely on the user applying a kernel patch (I don't believe it's broadly disseminated yet), and if you wanted to run more than one HARES based program, well, you couldn't (unless they rely on a single key for all HARES applications, which opens them up to having their private key posted on pastebin). Plus, the decryption key would have to be stored in the binary somewhere, unless they want to provide custom dongles which would provide the key to the hardware directly. As for blocking GDB and its ilk, the knowledge of how to disable ptrace blocking in executables is already fairly broadly disseminated on the internet. I also don't see it working around the VM problem (short of saying "I don't run in VMs, period", which would severely limit the reach of such binaries). Interesting idea in theory, but without significant changes to the underlying hardware or kernels, I don't see it functioning in practice (yet). It has the capability of blocking your casual user from accessing the application, but the folks they seem to really want to defend against would have few problems working around these limitations.
- pstrateman 12y agoIt's certainly DRM and thus broken. The question is how broken relative to other DRM.