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The real goal here is not to provide state-level security; it is to increase the cost of massive surveillance by deploying the easy parts of PGP everywhere. The
by rakoo 12y ago
The real goal here is not to provide state-level security; it is to increase the cost of massive surveillance by deploying the easy parts of PGP everywhere. The people who are highly dependent on security will run through the whole procedure anyway, they won't just rely on whiteout. "Johnny", on the other end of the spectrum, will see the privacy of his communication greatly improved againts passive attacks.
Much like HTTPS Everywhere, it is not enough to guarantee that your messages will be secure against a sufficiently-funded and determined attacker. It puts some power back to the people to enjoy better privacy of communication.
- Kalium 12y agoWhen the attitude is to dismiss every "corner case" that arises, suddenly you find yourself not doing any security work. After all, every attack is a corner case. 99% of users will never be attacked. Why spend all this energy on things most users will never need?
- im2w1l 12y ago99% of users will be dragnetted though. And more than 10% (pulling this out my ass) will use insecure wifi.
- MichaelGG 12y agoThen just require TLS on SMTP. Bam, no more dragnet, zero inconvenience to users. And, no problems with spam filtering or data recovery either.
- rakoo 12y agoPGP is end-to-end, TLS is not. PGP does improve privacy by reducing the number of people able to understand the content.