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The point you're still missing is that if an activity is only worth $5 to you, then a $10 penalty will make you stop. It doesn't matter if you're Bill Gates. A

by mc808 12y ago

The point you're still missing is that if an activity is only worth $5 to you, then a $10 penalty will make you stop. It doesn't matter if you're Bill Gates. Also, the penalty should be as small as possible to get the desired outcome. If the penalty is $100,000, you're more likely to put up a fight than if it's $10, regardless of your income or how much you valued the original activity.

jsprogrammer 12y ago
>The point you're still missing is that if an activity is only worth $5 to you, then a $10 penalty will make you stop. Only if you accept that immediate relative dollar values are a person's (in this case a non-physical, corporate entity's) only motivation. This view is cynical and likely not true in all cases. I think your point is contradictory, First you claim that income vs. penalty is the only concern, but at the end of your post you appear to claim that there is a threshold at which income and/or perceived value of the original activity ceases to be a concern. >... regardless of your income or how much you valued the original activity. I'm willing to accept that the actual persons that determine Marriott's policies, and therefore physical activities in the real-world (through the policy-makers' and/or their subordinates' actions), are motivated purely by the actions' perceived ability to extract currency from other people. However, that is all the more reason to consider the totality of the organization and its income in any judgement about the organization. As a matter of cost-benefit analysis, the organization may judge that they can absorb a particular fine, but will continue its "evil" behavior, in the sole pursuit of profit, by attempting to hide or disguise the offending behavior. We've seen this pattern play out over and over throughout history and even in very recent history in many industries, including mining, banking, manufacturing, political influencing, etc. Marriott itself even began going down that path by attempting to legitimize its interference through obscure (at least to most of the people affected by the interference) political means.
- pc86 12y ago
  Just to be clear, are you arguing the fine should be a percentage of net income or some other method that varies based on the revenue of the parent entity?
  - jsprogrammer 12y ago
    I don't know, or have much opinion on, what is a fair fine (if any).
logfromblammo 12y ago
It is a bit more complex than that. Assume that the offending behavior is worth $X to the offender. Also assume that the regulatory fine levied for that behavior is $Y. Further assume that $Z is the cost for the offender to achieve regulatory compliance. For the sake of argument, $W is the cost of resisting the regulator (including fines). The benefit of passive non-compliance is $X - $Y. The benefit of compliance is -$Z. The benefit of active resistance is $X - $W. A rational actor will choose the option with greatest benefit, so $Y > $X + $Z will encourage compliance over non-compliance. If $W > $X + $Z, that also encourages compliance over resistance. In either case, it is apparent that $Z amount is working against the regulator. As long as the benefit achieved from continuing the behavior plus the benefit of not having to pay the cost to stop doing it exceeds the external costs of continuing, it will not stop. But there's more. Assume $V to be the cost of resuming the behavior after it stops. Now, in order to achieve nonzero $X, $V must be paid. Now the benefit of non-compliance is $X - $V - $Y. The benefit of compliance is $0. The benefit of resistance is $X - $V - $W. That puts a higher cost on the other side of the equation. the ability to rip out, confiscate, and destroy the equipment forces the actor to discount the cost of just unplugging all of its devices, which is what allows the fine to be matched to the benefit from continuing the activity. Thus, the FCC can look at the mean daily income realized from jamming and set that as the initial guess for a persuasive daily fine. But the FCC also has to make the total cost of fighting them in court higher than just paying the fines, otherwise everybody would fight.

by mc808 12y ago

jsprogrammer 12y ago

>The point you're still missing is that if an activity is only worth $5 to you, then a $10 penalty will make you stop. Only if you accept that immediate relative dollar values are a person's (in this case a non-physical, corporate entity's) only motivation. This view is cynical and likely not true in all cases. I think your point is contradictory, First you claim that income vs. penalty is the only concern, but at the end of your post you appear to claim that there is a threshold at which income and/or perceived value of the original activity ceases to be a concern. >... regardless of your income or how much you valued the original activity. I'm willing to accept that the actual persons that determine Marriott's policies, and therefore physical activities in the real-world (through the policy-makers' and/or their subordinates' actions), are motivated purely by the actions' perceived ability to extract currency from other people. However, that is all the more reason to consider the totality of the organization and its income in any judgement about the organization. As a matter of cost-benefit analysis, the organization may judge that they can absorb a particular fine, but will continue its "evil" behavior, in the sole pursuit of profit, by attempting to hide or disguise the offending behavior. We've seen this pattern play out over and over throughout history and even in very recent history in many industries, including mining, banking, manufacturing, political influencing, etc. Marriott itself even began going down that path by attempting to legitimize its interference through obscure (at least to most of the people affected by the interference) political means.

pc86 12y ago
Just to be clear, are you arguing the fine should be a percentage of net income or some other method that varies based on the revenue of the parent entity?
- jsprogrammer 12y ago
  I don't know, or have much opinion on, what is a fair fine (if any).

logfromblammo 12y ago

It is a bit more complex than that. Assume that the offending behavior is worth $X to the offender. Also assume that the regulatory fine levied for that behavior is $Y. Further assume that $Z is the cost for the offender to achieve regulatory compliance. For the sake of argument, $W is the cost of resisting the regulator (including fines). The benefit of passive non-compliance is $X - $Y. The benefit of compliance is -$Z. The benefit of active resistance is $X - $W. A rational actor will choose the option with greatest benefit, so $Y > $X + $Z will encourage compliance over non-compliance. If $W > $X + $Z, that also encourages compliance over resistance. In either case, it is apparent that $Z amount is working against the regulator. As long as the benefit achieved from continuing the behavior plus the benefit of not having to pay the cost to stop doing it exceeds the external costs of continuing, it will not stop. But there's more. Assume $V to be the cost of resuming the behavior after it stops. Now, in order to achieve nonzero $X, $V must be paid. Now the benefit of non-compliance is $X - $V - $Y. The benefit of compliance is $0. The benefit of resistance is $X - $V - $W. That puts a higher cost on the other side of the equation. the ability to rip out, confiscate, and destroy the equipment forces the actor to discount the cost of just unplugging all of its devices, which is what allows the fine to be matched to the benefit from continuing the activity. Thus, the FCC can look at the mean daily income realized from jamming and set that as the initial guess for a persuasive daily fine. But the FCC also has to make the total cost of fighting them in court higher than just paying the fines, otherwise everybody would fight.