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SeL4: OS with formal correctness + security proof
- contingencies 12y agoseL4 can run Linux in a virtual machine. (x86 + Intel VT-x + EPT + MSI HPET). We are working on supporting virtualised Linux on ARM processors with virtualisation extensions (presently A15/A7 cores), a release should not be far off. Apparently seL4 is the world’s only hypervisor with a sound worst-case execution-time (WCET) analysis, and as such the only one that can give you actual real-time guarantees, no matter what others may be claiming. Naturally the confidentiality proof makes no guarantees about the absence of covert timing channels. From http://sel4.systems/FAQ/#virtualisation http://sel4.systems/FAQ/#virtualisation
- contingencies 12y agohttp://youtu.be/lRndE7rSXiI http://youtu.be/lRndE7rSXiI The implementation is correct against this abstract specification ... so bug-free, etc. The implications, there's many of them, but just a few obvious ones: it's not possible for this kernel to have a buffer overflow; it cannot - it provably does not use uninitialized variables or dereference null pointers, there's no stack smashing, you can't have code injection, there's no return oriented programming. Any of that stuff is just not possible - provably. So that's nice!