3 ms·
The assumption they make is that the payoff for voting on a decision is linearly proportional to the number of people the decision affects. In my case, that's
by MarkPNeyer 17y ago
The assumption they make is that the payoff for voting on a decision is linearly proportional to the number of people the decision affects.
In my case, that's not true - i don't get utility from telling other people what to do. Quite frankly, the assumption that people enjoy telling others what to do scares me. I'd like to think it isn't true, but something tells me that's just idealism.
- diN0bot 17y agoone's impact is not necessarily "telling others what to do," though i see your point when the consequence of this action is deciding legislatures or executives. nonetheless, i think the psychology behind caring about voting and, say, programming, is still similar: do i have an impact or am i just a rat in the maze?
- camccann 17y agoIt's not about you telling other people what to do, it's about picking someone else who will be telling people what to do. Nothing you do will change the fact that somebody will be selected; all you can do is influence the choice. Unless all candidates are (by your evaluation) of equal merit, voting for the one you prefer is (disregarding any costs of participation) pretty much by definition going to influence how much utility you get. And, unless you assign nonlinear utility (or none at all) to the experiences of other people, the number of people impacted is obviously going to be, in the limit, linearly proportional to the utility payoff. Gratuitous example: Political Candidate X runs on a platform that he will indefinitely imprison and torture 0.1% of the population, but only people that you personally have never (and will never meet). His opponent, Candidate Y, runs on a platform of doing absolutely nothing in office. How does the utility of voting for Candidate Y differ depending on whether the relevant population is a thousand people, or ten million?