We know that a global adversary exists, and that Tor is vulnerable to certain types of attacks by such an adversary (e.g. [1,2]). Given that the list of relays

We know that a global adversary exists, and that Tor is vulnerable to certain types of attacks by such an adversary (e.g. [1,2]). Given that the list of relays is public by design, that their (albeit encrypted) communication can be monitored by the adversary, that popular hidden services will be moving a significant amount of traffic to and from a single static IP address in a manner modifiable by any user of it, and that there are known methods of disrupting hidden services to effect a global change in this [3] - it follows that such hidden services are rather more vulnerable to deanonymisation, compared to most other users. Seems like running one is an incredibly risky thing to be doing. [1] http://cryptome.org/2013/08/tor-users-routed.pdf http://cryptome.org/2013/08/tor-users-routed.pdf [2] https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=556&format=pdf https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=... [3] http://donncha.is/2013/05/trawling-tor-hidden-services/ http://donncha.is/2013/05/trawling-tor-hidden-services/