4 ms·

Where did I equate the Hard Problem with dualism? I'm contending with a view that this article surveyed. Namely, "Nonetheless, just occasionally, science has d

Where did I equate the Hard Problem with dualism? I'm contending with a view that this article surveyed. Namely, "Nonetheless, just occasionally, science has dropped tantalising hints that this spooky extra ingredient might be real." Furthermore, Point #2 attacks the use of thought experiments as a means of understand the Hard Problem. Point #3 relates to why the Hard Problem is so hard. Point #4 gives an analogy supporting Dennett's position.

rosser 12y ago
As far as I understand it, one of the main things that makes the Hard Problem so hard is "epistemic asymmetry": the only consciousness you can even know exists is your own. That's the point of p-zombies, not to be a clever thought experiment (about which you're mostly right, btw), but to very pointedly illustrate the very real, and very frustrating fact that (thus far) there is no proof whatsoever that the notional "lights are on" anywhere else in the universe but in one's own skull. As for point #4, and Dennett, I'm going to have to beg off discussing, because I don't want to have to resort to that kind of language before lunch. (Read: really, really not a fan.)
- Marazan 12y ago
  You don't know your own consciousness exists. You can just be experiencing something that is not consciousness but that you think is. That's the ludicrous banality of the Hard Problem.
  - rosser 12y ago
    You can just be experiencing something that is not consciousness... That's what consciousness is: to borrow Thomas Nagel's phrase (which Chalmers also uses frequently), "the thing that it feels like" to be something. By every reasonable definition I've ever heard — and I've studied and read about this stuff for decades — that's pretty much a constant: consciousness is the experiential part of ... you know, experience. Yes, it's entirely possible — even common — to be mistaken or misled about the content of your experience, but not the fact that you are experiencing. In a discussion already absurdly full of sophistry, your comment should win a very large, gaudy prize.
    - Marazan 12y ago
      In that case consciousness doesn't seem that Hard.
    - deleted 12y ago
      [deleted]

rosser 12y ago

As far as I understand it, one of the main things that makes the Hard Problem so hard is "epistemic asymmetry": the only consciousness you can even know exists is your own. That's the point of p-zombies, not to be a clever thought experiment (about which you're mostly right, btw), but to very pointedly illustrate the very real, and very frustrating fact that (thus far) there is no proof whatsoever that the notional "lights are on" anywhere else in the universe but in one's own skull. As for point #4, and Dennett, I'm going to have to beg off discussing, because I don't want to have to resort to that kind of language before lunch. (Read: really, really not a fan.)

Marazan 12y ago
You don't know your own consciousness exists. You can just be experiencing something that is not consciousness but that you think is. That's the ludicrous banality of the Hard Problem.
- rosser 12y ago
  You can just be experiencing something that is not consciousness... That's what consciousness is: to borrow Thomas Nagel's phrase (which Chalmers also uses frequently), "the thing that it feels like" to be something. By every reasonable definition I've ever heard — and I've studied and read about this stuff for decades — that's pretty much a constant: consciousness is the experiential part of ... you know, experience. Yes, it's entirely possible — even common — to be mistaken or misled about the content of your experience, but not the fact that you are experiencing. In a discussion already absurdly full of sophistry, your comment should win a very large, gaudy prize.
  - Marazan 12y ago
    In that case consciousness doesn't seem that Hard.
  - deleted 12y ago
    [deleted]