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I don't know if this helps the argument for free will, but physics still has randomness. Radiation, for example, is to my knowledge completely random. So at lea
by sliverstorm 12y ago
I don't know if this helps the argument for free will, but physics still has randomness. Radiation, for example, is to my knowledge completely random. So at least from a mile-high view, you can't actually perfectly predict the outcome of everything, even if you could model perfectly.
- duaneb 12y agoThe universe is not deterministic. However, this was used to say that "there is still free will!!!" (e.g. Penrose). So, there is "hard" and "soft" determinism—the universe may not be determinstic, but that doesn't mean we're any less determined by physical processes.
- AnimalMuppet 12y agoBut quantum uncertainty is not the same as me having free will, because my will does not control the quantum uncertainty. Quantum noise may influence the atoms that control the neurons that control my brain, but that just makes me not a perfectly-determined machine. There's noise at the bottom layer of the machine, but that noise is not the same as me having free will.
- macspoofing 12y ago>I don't know if this helps the argument for free will, but physics still has randomness. It doesn't help at all with Free Will. How can you have free will if you're a victim of random events out of 'your' control?
- sliverstorm 12y agoIt's at least a step away from "everything can be predetermined with physics". If I could perfectly predict your actions (with a physics model), most people agree free will is impossible. It doesn't mean free will exists, of course. It's just less improbable?
- macspoofing 12y ago>It's at least a step away from "everything can be predetermined with physics". You'll never get away from that. We are material beings, made out of the same material as everything else in the universe and hence subject to the same fundamentals laws. >If I could perfectly predict your actions (with a physics model), most people agree free will is impossible. If that's the case, there should not be a problem. Even in a fully deterministic universe we'll never be able to run a simulation to predict the actions for anyone anyway. You're a product of not only the actions of the trillions of particles that make up you, but also of the countless of particles in the environment over your entire life-span, that of your parents, your grandparents, all the way to the big bang. We'll never be able to simulate the trillions of particles that make up any specific body, much less that body's environment using fundamental equations. So if predictability of particles is how you measure free will, then we have free will. Things get muddled a little because we may be able to get a 'good enough' prediction of someone's behaviour just by analyzing his/her neurons with a fMRI or something. This is akin to the difference between knowing tomorrow's weather EXACTLY by simulating every particle of the atmosphere vs. knowing the weather tomorrow to some degree of confidence by analyzing higher-order patterns like air pressure, cloud coverage, temperature etc. So your definition is too weak. Most people would say we don't have free will if we live in a universe with deterministic laws. Whether anyone can actually use those laws to predict your actions is not that relevant. >It doesn't mean free will exists, of course. It's just less improbable? Not really. Think about, let's say every decision you made was determined by a (quantum, full random, totally unpredictable) coin toss. That doesn't get you one step closer towards a libertarian-type of free will. Sure your actions are, in principle, much less, predictable to those around you, but that's not the yard-stick we use to measure free will by anyway. Your actions are already unpredictable in a deterministic universe anyway. You merely traded being a slave to deterministic laws of physics to being a slave of random coin toss. Second, it's an open question how much quantum randomness actually affects your day-to-day actions. Quantum effects are only pronounced on very small scales. At the scale of groups of atoms, molecules and cells, Newtonian physics, chemistry, and biology, and neurology can be substituted without loss of precision.