5 ms·

>Oh, and don't forget that the super-secret launch code for minuteman missiles across the US was... uh, 00000000, for several decades. I believe this was the c

by Phlarp 12y ago

>Oh, and don't forget that the super-secret launch code for minuteman missiles across the US was... uh, 00000000, for several decades. I believe this was the combination to the locks on the launch bunker access doors, not the actual launch codes. Either way-- laughable security for the military's crown jewels.

mikeash 12y ago
According to this article, the all-zeroes code was on the Permissive Action Links, which are the locks on the bombs themselves: http://web.archive.org/web/20120511191600/http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm http://web.archive.org/web/20120511191600/http://www.cdi.org...
- Phlarp 12y ago
  You are indeed correct, I'll leave my comment to stand as a testament to my wrongness. The bunker doors were "fixed" with metal plates after it was shown they could be easily shimmied with a credit card.
  - mikeash 12y ago
    It's understandable, there are some things the mind simply doesn't want to believe, and an all-zeroes password on a nuclear bomb easily qualifies. Do you happen to have a link that discusses the bunker doors? I don't think I'd heard of that one.
    - Phlarp 12y ago
      This is all discussed in "Command and Control" by Eric Schlosser. I'm not sure if that specific story is available for free online somewhere, but it's hardly an isolated incident of terrible security within the nuclear arms community. The book bounces between two narratives, the first being an in depth look at a specific accident where a rocket exploded in it's silo, the second being a broader overview of the command and control structure around nuclear tech spanning from the plutonium spheres used by scientists in the manhattan project, all the way up to 80's era MAD policy and ICBMs on 24/7 alert. Another one of my favorites from that book was the EOD tech that put a ready-to-rumble teller-ulam thermonuclear device into the bed of his pick-up truck, drove it off the base, dismantled it in order to show off to a girl, then reassembled and returned it. Although, I can't personally verify the source of that story.
      - jfoutz 12y ago
        Ever since reading Snowcrash, i've wanted my own personal nuclear umbrella. Not enough to actually do anything about it, of course. It just seems like the ultimate in "an armed society is a polite society."
      - mikeash 12y ago
        Thanks. I keep seeing that book mentioned and I'll have to check it out. The story of the guy trying to impress a girl sounds worth it all by itself.
maaku 12y ago
> Either way-- laughable security for the military's crown jewels. The military would disagree. The all-zeros combination code was chosen on purpose because it was felt that having a code at all was a reduction in security since the code revelation procedure became a single point of failure. These aspects of the nuclear security system were designed by politicians, and weren't exactly the best of ideas, so the military did what they needed to comply with the law but keep the nuclear arsenal secure and available.
- Phlarp 12y ago
  It always seemed to me that the military, specifically the Strategic Air Command appreciated that security and ease of use are trade offs, and consistently chose solutions very far to the "ease of use" end of that spectrum. SAC was considerably more worried that bomb security measures would inhibit swift retaliation than they were that poor security would allow for an unauthorized detonation. More civilized individuals might call that insane as opposed to laughable.
- phillmv 12y ago
  >These aspects of the nuclear security system were designed by politicians, This is false. I suggest reading Command and Control; it is illuminating and terrifying. The setup you described evolved from a tug of war between competing bureaucratic interests combined with ineffective oversight. The various military organizations fought to keep control and funding of prestigious nuclear weapons; the political arm dealt with the paradox inherent in having a system that was ready to be deployed at a moment's notice, but impossible to detonate accidentally. The compromise that emerged were these broken systems. To quote from Command and Control: >After the accident at Thule, the Pentagon had ordered SAC [Strategic Air Command] to impose some form of use control. Instead of relying on PALs, during the early 1970s the Air Force put a coded switch in the cockpit of every bomber that carried nuclear weapons. The switch permitted an arming signal to be sent to the bomb bay when the right code was entered. The lock had been placed on the bomber, not inside the bombs—and a stolen weapon could still be detonated with a simple DC signal. SAC was far more worried about its weapons being rendered inoperable during wartime than about someone stealing them or using them without proper authorization. During the late 1970s, a coded switch was finally placed in the control center of every SAC ballistic missile. It unlocked the missile, not the warhead. And as a final act of defiance, SAC demonstrated the importance of code management to the usefulness of any coded switch. The combination necessary to launch the missiles was the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.

by Phlarp 12y ago

mikeash 12y ago

According to this article, the all-zeroes code was on the Permissive Action Links, which are the locks on the bombs themselves: http://web.archive.org/web/20120511191600/http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm http://web.archive.org/web/20120511191600/http://www.cdi.org...

Phlarp 12y ago
You are indeed correct, I'll leave my comment to stand as a testament to my wrongness. The bunker doors were "fixed" with metal plates after it was shown they could be easily shimmied with a credit card.
- mikeash 12y ago
  It's understandable, there are some things the mind simply doesn't want to believe, and an all-zeroes password on a nuclear bomb easily qualifies. Do you happen to have a link that discusses the bunker doors? I don't think I'd heard of that one.
  - Phlarp 12y ago
    This is all discussed in "Command and Control" by Eric Schlosser. I'm not sure if that specific story is available for free online somewhere, but it's hardly an isolated incident of terrible security within the nuclear arms community. The book bounces between two narratives, the first being an in depth look at a specific accident where a rocket exploded in it's silo, the second being a broader overview of the command and control structure around nuclear tech spanning from the plutonium spheres used by scientists in the manhattan project, all the way up to 80's era MAD policy and ICBMs on 24/7 alert. Another one of my favorites from that book was the EOD tech that put a ready-to-rumble teller-ulam thermonuclear device into the bed of his pick-up truck, drove it off the base, dismantled it in order to show off to a girl, then reassembled and returned it. Although, I can't personally verify the source of that story.
    - jfoutz 12y ago
      Ever since reading Snowcrash, i've wanted my own personal nuclear umbrella. Not enough to actually do anything about it, of course. It just seems like the ultimate in "an armed society is a polite society."
    - mikeash 12y ago
      Thanks. I keep seeing that book mentioned and I'll have to check it out. The story of the guy trying to impress a girl sounds worth it all by itself.

maaku 12y ago

> Either way-- laughable security for the military's crown jewels. The military would disagree. The all-zeros combination code was chosen on purpose because it was felt that having a code at all was a reduction in security since the code revelation procedure became a single point of failure. These aspects of the nuclear security system were designed by politicians, and weren't exactly the best of ideas, so the military did what they needed to comply with the law but keep the nuclear arsenal secure and available.

Phlarp 12y ago
It always seemed to me that the military, specifically the Strategic Air Command appreciated that security and ease of use are trade offs, and consistently chose solutions very far to the "ease of use" end of that spectrum. SAC was considerably more worried that bomb security measures would inhibit swift retaliation than they were that poor security would allow for an unauthorized detonation. More civilized individuals might call that insane as opposed to laughable.
phillmv 12y ago
>These aspects of the nuclear security system were designed by politicians, This is false. I suggest reading Command and Control; it is illuminating and terrifying. The setup you described evolved from a tug of war between competing bureaucratic interests combined with ineffective oversight. The various military organizations fought to keep control and funding of prestigious nuclear weapons; the political arm dealt with the paradox inherent in having a system that was ready to be deployed at a moment's notice, but impossible to detonate accidentally. The compromise that emerged were these broken systems. To quote from Command and Control: >After the accident at Thule, the Pentagon had ordered SAC [Strategic Air Command] to impose some form of use control. Instead of relying on PALs, during the early 1970s the Air Force put a coded switch in the cockpit of every bomber that carried nuclear weapons. The switch permitted an arming signal to be sent to the bomb bay when the right code was entered. The lock had been placed on the bomber, not inside the bombs—and a stolen weapon could still be detonated with a simple DC signal. SAC was far more worried about its weapons being rendered inoperable during wartime than about someone stealing them or using them without proper authorization. During the late 1970s, a coded switch was finally placed in the control center of every SAC ballistic missile. It unlocked the missile, not the warhead. And as a final act of defiance, SAC demonstrated the importance of code management to the usefulness of any coded switch. The combination necessary to launch the missiles was the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.