3 ms·
That depends on what your trust model is. Somebody is resolving the DNS query, and then the result gets transmitted to you. If all you're worried about the resu
by derf_ 12y ago
That depends on what your trust model is. Somebody is resolving the DNS query, and then the result gets transmitted to you. If all you're worried about the result being MITM'd during transit, then encryption is sufficient. You can set up DNSCrypt to deal with this today [1].
But often the provider resolving the query is itself untrustworthy. Most providers these days (including OpenDNS) redirect invalid queries to their own landing pages (which poisons caches and has other bad effects). Providers may "censor" certain domains. Or be subverted by state-level actors (see: Belgacom). In DNSSEC, the root of trust is the administrator of the DNS root zone (e.g., Verisign, whom you're probably already trusting anyway).
[1] But encryption is not a panacea. As soon as you visit the address(es) returned, someone will get a pretty good idea what you looked up.
- tptacek 12y agoIt doesn't matter if you can MITM someone through the DNS. Stipulate that it's trivial to do that. You still can't get in the middle of my SSH connection, because SSH authenticates itself, bidirectionally.
- derf_ 12y agoIn that case, DNSSEC probably isn't doing much for you (besides the systemic effects of discouraging providers from returning false DNS results in the first place), but sadly not everything on the internet is so well-designed as ssh. Being unable to specify a port in MX records, leaving SMTP on port 25 with only STARTTLS for encryption being one good example.
- Panino 12y ago> Most providers these days (including OpenDNS) redirect invalid queries to their own landing pages OpenDNS stopped doing this on June 6 2014: http://blog.opendns.com/2014/05/29/no-more-ads/ http://blog.opendns.com/2014/05/29/no-more-ads/