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> Buffer overflows in trusted code have to go. This means getting rid of the languages with buffer overflow problems. In the meantime, since moving away from C
by dmix 12y ago
> Buffer overflows in trusted code have to go. This means getting rid of the languages with buffer overflow problems.
In the meantime, since moving away from C will take years, we need to invest in better exploit-mitigation technology instead of relying on bug-hunting-driven-security. That means OS/kernel developers need to start taking security seriously and keeping up with attackers. This means adding proactive measures instead of slowly reacting only when a new CVE comes out. Which sadly far from the reality at the moment.
For example, OpenBSD made headlines for adding W^X to the whole kernel but hackers have already been bypassing W^X on iOS for years:
http://bsd.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=6723643&cid=48812833 http://bsd.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=6723643&cid=48812833
>> These protections may guard against a (very small subset of) casual attackers, but they're just another minor hurdle for determined attackers.
In addition we need to move away from signature-based AV towards host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS). It is not accident that all the feds who left government cybersecurity jobs in recent years moved to build private companies creating HIDS products and making millions selling them to big corps (FireEye, Crowdstrike, etc).
The only options available for consumers and the average sys admin are security tools easily bypassed by any semi-sophisticated adversary (for ex: Anti-virus/RKhunter/SELinux/most trusted computing code-integrity systems/etc).