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I believe that calling something evil is gross oversimplifation. Terrible things happen. Evil has overtones that I disagree with, if that makes sense.

by unalone 17y ago

foldr 17y ago
It makes a little bit of sense, but I don't see how it's relevant to the problem of evil. You can pose the problem with pretty much whatever notion of evil you like: "If there is a good, omnipotent God, why do terrible things happen?"
- unalone 17y ago
  Well, yeah. That's why nonbelief hurts the debate also. My response is a simple "There isn't." Kind of a flat debate.
  - foldr 17y ago
    As I said, whether or not God exists, the question remains whether or not the existence of God is _compatible_ with the existence of evil. That's what theologians actually discuss. Stating God's non-existence just doesn't address the question at issue.
    - jamesbritt 17y ago
      Well, it does in that before looking at the relationship of gods and evil, you first have to establish what, exactly, are the characteristics of gods, how many gods are there, etc. Do theologians consider the case for all of concievable gods? Multiple gods? Only one god?
      - foldr 17y ago
        > Do theologians consider the case for all of concievable gods? Multiple gods? Only one god? Obviously, as has been explained, the problem arises in connection with all gods who are perfectly good and also omnipotent, so I don't quite see what you're getting at here.
        jamesbritt 17y ago
        "I don't quite see what you're getting at here." Without first establishing the number of gods and their qualities, questions about how they deal with evil seems pointless.
        foldr 17y ago
        Well now you're saying something quite different. Before, you said it was "necessary" to find out which (if any) gods exist before asking whether or not the existence of various kinds of god is compatible with the existence of evil. Now you're just saying that this particular sort of hypothetical question seems pointless to you. I can't argue with your lack of interest, but there is no reason to think that hypothetical questions in general are pointless; and in the particular case at hand, moral philosophers have learned a lot by investigating these questions. The question of whether or not evil is possible in a world created by a good and omnipotent God is basically equivalent to the question of whether or not it is logically possible for good to exist without evil, and this is a question of fundamental interest in moral philosophy (whatever one's religious beliefs). It's worth repeating that the scope of the problem is very narrow with respect to classes of deity. There is basically only one kind of God for whom the problem of evil arises -- a God who is omnipotent and wholly good. The problem doesn't really arise in any interesting way for the Gods of non-Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions. For this reason, it's not the case that we have to catalog many kinds of god, one-by-one, and then consider the problem separately in relation to each kind of God.
        jamesbritt 17y ago
        "The question of whether or not evil is possible in a world created by a good and omnipotent God is basically equivalent to the question of whether or not it is logically possible for good to exist without evil." No, not really. Apples and oranges. "The problem doesn't really arise in any interesting way for the Gods of non-Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions." Lack of imagination here. You really can't imagine various gods for whom the question of evil arises in any interesting way?
    - unalone 17y ago
      If God doesn't exist, it's not worth arguing Him. It's like asking if God can make a boulder so heavy He Himself cannot lift it. It's a worthwhile debate if omnipotence exists, but it doesn't, so the argument is moot.
      - foldr 17y ago
        Hypothetical questions aren't necessarily moot. In both the actual case and hand and your boulder example, quite a lot has been learned (e.g. about the notions of necessity and possibility) through the study of these cases.

I believe that calling something evil is gross oversimplifation. Terrible things happen. Evil has overtones that I disagree with, if that makes sense.

by unalone 17y ago

I believe that calling something evil is gross oversimplifation. Terrible things happen. Evil has overtones that I disagree with, if that makes sense.

foldr 17y ago

It makes a little bit of sense, but I don't see how it's relevant to the problem of evil. You can pose the problem with pretty much whatever notion of evil you like: "If there is a good, omnipotent God, why do terrible things happen?"

unalone 17y ago
Well, yeah. That's why nonbelief hurts the debate also. My response is a simple "There isn't." Kind of a flat debate.
- foldr 17y ago
  As I said, whether or not God exists, the question remains whether or not the existence of God is _compatible_ with the existence of evil. That's what theologians actually discuss. Stating God's non-existence just doesn't address the question at issue.
  - jamesbritt 17y ago
    Well, it does in that before looking at the relationship of gods and evil, you first have to establish what, exactly, are the characteristics of gods, how many gods are there, etc. Do theologians consider the case for all of concievable gods? Multiple gods? Only one god?
    - foldr 17y ago
      > Do theologians consider the case for all of concievable gods? Multiple gods? Only one god? Obviously, as has been explained, the problem arises in connection with all gods who are perfectly good and also omnipotent, so I don't quite see what you're getting at here.
      - jamesbritt 17y ago
        "I don't quite see what you're getting at here." Without first establishing the number of gods and their qualities, questions about how they deal with evil seems pointless.
        foldr 17y ago
        Well now you're saying something quite different. Before, you said it was "necessary" to find out which (if any) gods exist before asking whether or not the existence of various kinds of god is compatible with the existence of evil. Now you're just saying that this particular sort of hypothetical question seems pointless to you. I can't argue with your lack of interest, but there is no reason to think that hypothetical questions in general are pointless; and in the particular case at hand, moral philosophers have learned a lot by investigating these questions. The question of whether or not evil is possible in a world created by a good and omnipotent God is basically equivalent to the question of whether or not it is logically possible for good to exist without evil, and this is a question of fundamental interest in moral philosophy (whatever one's religious beliefs). It's worth repeating that the scope of the problem is very narrow with respect to classes of deity. There is basically only one kind of God for whom the problem of evil arises -- a God who is omnipotent and wholly good. The problem doesn't really arise in any interesting way for the Gods of non-Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions. For this reason, it's not the case that we have to catalog many kinds of god, one-by-one, and then consider the problem separately in relation to each kind of God.
        jamesbritt 17y ago
        "The question of whether or not evil is possible in a world created by a good and omnipotent God is basically equivalent to the question of whether or not it is logically possible for good to exist without evil." No, not really. Apples and oranges. "The problem doesn't really arise in any interesting way for the Gods of non-Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions." Lack of imagination here. You really can't imagine various gods for whom the question of evil arises in any interesting way?
  - unalone 17y ago
    If God doesn't exist, it's not worth arguing Him. It's like asking if God can make a boulder so heavy He Himself cannot lift it. It's a worthwhile debate if omnipotence exists, but it doesn't, so the argument is moot.
    - foldr 17y ago
      Hypothetical questions aren't necessarily moot. In both the actual case and hand and your boulder example, quite a lot has been learned (e.g. about the notions of necessity and possibility) through the study of these cases.