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I have. I took a course on religion last semester. Generally, I agreed with and loved the various sociological theories—the things that tried to explain the psy

by unalone 17y ago

I have. I took a course on religion last semester. Generally, I agreed with and loved the various sociological theories—the things that tried to explain the psychological origins of religion, for instance, were fascinating. But past a certain point, I find that I lose interest. I can't entertain a debate over whether evil could exist under a good God, because I don't believe in God or in evil.

foldr 17y ago
If you don't find it interesting then you don't find it interesting, but that's quite a retreat from what you were claiming in your initial comment. >because I don't believe in God or in evil. You don't believe that evil things happen?
- unalone 17y ago
  I believe that calling something evil is gross oversimplifation. Terrible things happen. Evil has overtones that I disagree with, if that makes sense.
  - foldr 17y ago
    It makes a little bit of sense, but I don't see how it's relevant to the problem of evil. You can pose the problem with pretty much whatever notion of evil you like: "If there is a good, omnipotent God, why do terrible things happen?"
    - unalone 17y ago
      Well, yeah. That's why nonbelief hurts the debate also. My response is a simple "There isn't." Kind of a flat debate.
      - foldr 17y ago
        As I said, whether or not God exists, the question remains whether or not the existence of God is _compatible_ with the existence of evil. That's what theologians actually discuss. Stating God's non-existence just doesn't address the question at issue.
        jamesbritt 17y ago
        Well, it does in that before looking at the relationship of gods and evil, you first have to establish what, exactly, are the characteristics of gods, how many gods are there, etc. Do theologians consider the case for all of concievable gods? Multiple gods? Only one god?
        foldr 17y ago
        > Do theologians consider the case for all of concievable gods? Multiple gods? Only one god? Obviously, as has been explained, the problem arises in connection with all gods who are perfectly good and also omnipotent, so I don't quite see what you're getting at here.
        jamesbritt 17y ago
        "I don't quite see what you're getting at here." Without first establishing the number of gods and their qualities, questions about how they deal with evil seems pointless.
        foldr 17y ago
        Well now you're saying something quite different. Before, you said it was "necessary" to find out which (if any) gods exist before asking whether or not the existence of various kinds of god is compatible with the existence of evil. Now you're just saying that this particular sort of hypothetical question seems pointless to you. I can't argue with your lack of interest, but there is no reason to think that hypothetical questions in general are pointless; and in the particular case at hand, moral philosophers have learned a lot by investigating these questions. The question of whether or not evil is possible in a world created by a good and omnipotent God is basically equivalent to the question of whether or not it is logically possible for good to exist without evil, and this is a question of fundamental interest in moral philosophy (whatever one's religious beliefs). It's worth repeating that the scope of the problem is very narrow with respect to classes of deity. There is basically only one kind of God for whom the problem of evil arises -- a God who is omnipotent and wholly good. The problem doesn't really arise in any interesting way for the Gods of non-Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions. For this reason, it's not the case that we have to catalog many kinds of god, one-by-one, and then consider the problem separately in relation to each kind of God.

by unalone 17y ago

foldr 17y ago

If you don't find it interesting then you don't find it interesting, but that's quite a retreat from what you were claiming in your initial comment. >because I don't believe in God or in evil. You don't believe that evil things happen?

unalone 17y ago
I believe that calling something evil is gross oversimplifation. Terrible things happen. Evil has overtones that I disagree with, if that makes sense.
- foldr 17y ago
  It makes a little bit of sense, but I don't see how it's relevant to the problem of evil. You can pose the problem with pretty much whatever notion of evil you like: "If there is a good, omnipotent God, why do terrible things happen?"
  - unalone 17y ago
    Well, yeah. That's why nonbelief hurts the debate also. My response is a simple "There isn't." Kind of a flat debate.
    - foldr 17y ago
      As I said, whether or not God exists, the question remains whether or not the existence of God is _compatible_ with the existence of evil. That's what theologians actually discuss. Stating God's non-existence just doesn't address the question at issue.
      - jamesbritt 17y ago
        Well, it does in that before looking at the relationship of gods and evil, you first have to establish what, exactly, are the characteristics of gods, how many gods are there, etc. Do theologians consider the case for all of concievable gods? Multiple gods? Only one god?
        foldr 17y ago
        > Do theologians consider the case for all of concievable gods? Multiple gods? Only one god? Obviously, as has been explained, the problem arises in connection with all gods who are perfectly good and also omnipotent, so I don't quite see what you're getting at here.
        jamesbritt 17y ago
        "I don't quite see what you're getting at here." Without first establishing the number of gods and their qualities, questions about how they deal with evil seems pointless.
        foldr 17y ago
        Well now you're saying something quite different. Before, you said it was "necessary" to find out which (if any) gods exist before asking whether or not the existence of various kinds of god is compatible with the existence of evil. Now you're just saying that this particular sort of hypothetical question seems pointless to you. I can't argue with your lack of interest, but there is no reason to think that hypothetical questions in general are pointless; and in the particular case at hand, moral philosophers have learned a lot by investigating these questions. The question of whether or not evil is possible in a world created by a good and omnipotent God is basically equivalent to the question of whether or not it is logically possible for good to exist without evil, and this is a question of fundamental interest in moral philosophy (whatever one's religious beliefs). It's worth repeating that the scope of the problem is very narrow with respect to classes of deity. There is basically only one kind of God for whom the problem of evil arises -- a God who is omnipotent and wholly good. The problem doesn't really arise in any interesting way for the Gods of non-Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions. For this reason, it's not the case that we have to catalog many kinds of god, one-by-one, and then consider the problem separately in relation to each kind of God.