> Boström argues that containment isn't really possible. He never argued that containment isn't possible, just that it's incredibly dangerous. In fact, in Supe

> Boström argues that containment isn't really possible. He never argued that containment isn't possible, just that it's incredibly dangerous. In fact, in Superintelligence, he uses the term Oracle as a means of referring to a contained or "boxed" superintelligent AGI. Just because the risks of constructing an Oracle or Oracles are extremely high, it doesn't mean we should refrain from doing so. In fact, it's more safe than the alternatives: a Genie or Sovereign; superintelligences that are entirely uncontained, the latter of which operating in a hands-off fashion in accordance with its goal/value system. Given the current, seemingly intractable nature of the superintelligence control problem, one possible method in which we may accomplish safe, superintelligent AGI is to first operate many variations of potentially unsafe "Oracles" and interrogate them for information that may further our research into AGI safety, or perhaps even solve the issue entirely. Generally speaking you shouldn't trust an Oracle, but if you have many radically different designs operating in containment that are oblivious to each other, the commonality in their output when posed such questions may assist in our realization of safe AGI that can operate in an uncontained fashion.