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> recreating And that's the crux of the question isn't it? How do we determine if the intelligence is recreated or merely mimicked? Does such a distinction mat

by psycr 12y ago

> recreating And that's the crux of the question isn't it? How do we determine if the intelligence is recreated or merely mimicked? Does such a distinction matter? Searle says yes. More here if you're interested: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/

ajuc 12y ago
This is misleading argument - there IS a Chinese speaker in the room, but it's not the person that executes the program - it's the system "person+program" that understands Chinese.
- henrikschroder 12y ago
  The whole point of the argument is that the system doesn't understand Chinese. The system doesn't know what each sentence means, they don't evoke feelings, memories, images in the person in the room, there is no analysis, no agreement or disagreement with what is being said, it's just mechanical lookup.
  - ThomPete 12y ago
    No the whole point of the argument is that the person in the room doesn't understand Chinese.
  - nbouscal 12y ago
    And the reason the argument is absurd is that of course the room doesn't understand Chinese; it's a lookup table! No Chinese speaker interacting with the Chinese room for any reasonable period of time would think it held a Chinese speaker, because all it accepts are questions, and it answers the same question the same way every time. Of course, Searle would say that the set of rules in the room is defined to be such that a Chinese person would think they were interacting with a Chinese speaker, but the very setup of the system prevents this from being possible. The thought experiment is fundamentally incoherent.
    - ajuc 12y ago
      I assumed the system has rewritable memory to remember previous questions, and the lookup is (all previous questions) -> next answer. With such setup (require infinite memory) the system is Turing-complete of course. If it works as you described it can't even answer "what was my n-th last question".
      - deleted 12y ago
        [deleted]
  - ajuc 12y ago
    > The system doesn't know what each sentence means You can't prove that. For all possible experiments that can be performed we can construct system that will be indistinguishable from entity we accept as understanding Chinese. If you got atom-by-atom description of human brain without knowing beforehand what it is you wouldn't be able to reason that this brain understands Chinese, so why do you think you can judge other systems? > they don't evoke feelings, memories, images in the person in the room, We were speaking about understanding, not emotions, memories etc. Yes you can define "understanding" = being like me, but it's not fair definition, and would exclude a lot of people. And then of course you can't proove that there are no emotions and memories. They can be simulated by system as well. Even if you wanted lookup table - you would need to include writable memory so the system can rembmber previous questions when asked about them, at that point the system is self-modifiable and can be thought of as having memories and emotions. > there is no analysis, no agreement or disagreement with what is being said How do you know there's no analysis? If the system is complex enough you can't know what it does internaly. Or show me theory of consiousnes that can distinguish systems that can understand Chinese and can't basing on the specification of the system.
  - nova 12y ago
    There's a very interesting discussion in Scott Aaronson's "Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity" (http://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/philos.pdf http://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/philos.pdf). Briefly (as far as I understand), a lot of philosophical thought has been dedicated to computability, not enough to computational complexity, i.e., the resources needed for computation. A naive "lookup table" implementation of the Chinese room simply wouldn't fit in the Universe. You'd need to throw in a great amount of compression, and then you get something that could possibly be considered "intelligent" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hutter_Prize http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hutter_Prize)
rndn 12y ago
The definition of AI does not matter when it's able to turn everyone into paperclips: http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Paperclip_maximizer http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Paperclip_maximizer
ThomPete 12y ago
The Chinese Room argument is the most sloppy argument ever made in that area. The real answer of course is we don't know. Just like the individual neuron in your brain do not understand Chinese so does the person in the room not understand it either. The entire house though does.
- Chathamization 12y ago
  Agreed. Does anyone really think there’s a single neuron that has an understanding of an aggregate thought. “I, neuron of this human, am transmitting this sense of joy because of the humor that is found watching this film.” No individual cell in our body has a sense of us as a whole; they’re all working inside their individual “Chinese boxes.” Most of the hard problem of consciousness arguments are silly and amount to little more than “a computer has no soul.”
dghf 12y ago
Daniel Dennett stuck the boot into the Chinese Room argument in Consciousness Explained (and probably in several other places as well). As he points out, it's based on an intellectual sleight-of-hand (what he calls an "intuition pump"). From the linked article on the Stanford site: > Searle imagines himself alone in a room following a computer program for responding to Chinese characters slipped under the door. Searle understands nothing of Chinese, and yet, by following the program for manipulating symbols and numerals just as a computer does, he produces appropriate strings of Chinese characters that fool those outside into thinking there is a Chinese speaker in the room. [Emphasis added.] Unless those outside are satisfied with a very rudimentary back-and-forth, such a program would have to be amazingly complicated (and those outside very patient, or the operator superhumanly fast). It's not just a question of "look up input Chinese character and return corresponding output character" -- which is never explicitly stated, but which we're subconsciously led to by the image of a human "following the program for manipulating symbols and numerals". Dennett gives an example where the outside person tells a joke, and asks the room's operator to explain it. You could also imagine a reading comprehension exercise, with questions ranging from purely structural ("What is the third word on the fifth line?") through semantic ("What colour was the girl's dress?") to analytical ("Why do you think the boy was sad?") Questions can be self-referential, or depend on previous questions (and their answers) or on a vast mass of knowledge we take for granted (a dress the colour of snow is white; a small boy might cry if his kite gets stuck in a tree). It doesn't seem so intuitive that a system that complex lacks anything we might legitimately describe as "understanding".

by psycr 12y ago

ajuc 12y ago

This is misleading argument - there IS a Chinese speaker in the room, but it's not the person that executes the program - it's the system "person+program" that understands Chinese.

henrikschroder 12y ago
The whole point of the argument is that the system doesn't understand Chinese. The system doesn't know what each sentence means, they don't evoke feelings, memories, images in the person in the room, there is no analysis, no agreement or disagreement with what is being said, it's just mechanical lookup.
- ThomPete 12y ago
  No the whole point of the argument is that the person in the room doesn't understand Chinese.
- nbouscal 12y ago
  And the reason the argument is absurd is that of course the room doesn't understand Chinese; it's a lookup table! No Chinese speaker interacting with the Chinese room for any reasonable period of time would think it held a Chinese speaker, because all it accepts are questions, and it answers the same question the same way every time. Of course, Searle would say that the set of rules in the room is defined to be such that a Chinese person would think they were interacting with a Chinese speaker, but the very setup of the system prevents this from being possible. The thought experiment is fundamentally incoherent.
  - ajuc 12y ago
    I assumed the system has rewritable memory to remember previous questions, and the lookup is (all previous questions) -> next answer. With such setup (require infinite memory) the system is Turing-complete of course. If it works as you described it can't even answer "what was my n-th last question".
    - deleted 12y ago
      [deleted]
- ajuc 12y ago
  > The system doesn't know what each sentence means You can't prove that. For all possible experiments that can be performed we can construct system that will be indistinguishable from entity we accept as understanding Chinese. If you got atom-by-atom description of human brain without knowing beforehand what it is you wouldn't be able to reason that this brain understands Chinese, so why do you think you can judge other systems? > they don't evoke feelings, memories, images in the person in the room, We were speaking about understanding, not emotions, memories etc. Yes you can define "understanding" = being like me, but it's not fair definition, and would exclude a lot of people. And then of course you can't proove that there are no emotions and memories. They can be simulated by system as well. Even if you wanted lookup table - you would need to include writable memory so the system can rembmber previous questions when asked about them, at that point the system is self-modifiable and can be thought of as having memories and emotions. > there is no analysis, no agreement or disagreement with what is being said How do you know there's no analysis? If the system is complex enough you can't know what it does internaly. Or show me theory of consiousnes that can distinguish systems that can understand Chinese and can't basing on the specification of the system.
- nova 12y ago
  There's a very interesting discussion in Scott Aaronson's "Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity" (http://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/philos.pdf http://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/philos.pdf). Briefly (as far as I understand), a lot of philosophical thought has been dedicated to computability, not enough to computational complexity, i.e., the resources needed for computation. A naive "lookup table" implementation of the Chinese room simply wouldn't fit in the Universe. You'd need to throw in a great amount of compression, and then you get something that could possibly be considered "intelligent" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hutter_Prize http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hutter_Prize)

rndn 12y ago

The definition of AI does not matter when it's able to turn everyone into paperclips: http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Paperclip_maximizer http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Paperclip_maximizer

ThomPete 12y ago

The Chinese Room argument is the most sloppy argument ever made in that area. The real answer of course is we don't know. Just like the individual neuron in your brain do not understand Chinese so does the person in the room not understand it either. The entire house though does.

Chathamization 12y ago
Agreed. Does anyone really think there’s a single neuron that has an understanding of an aggregate thought. “I, neuron of this human, am transmitting this sense of joy because of the humor that is found watching this film.” No individual cell in our body has a sense of us as a whole; they’re all working inside their individual “Chinese boxes.” Most of the hard problem of consciousness arguments are silly and amount to little more than “a computer has no soul.”

dghf 12y ago

Daniel Dennett stuck the boot into the Chinese Room argument in Consciousness Explained (and probably in several other places as well). As he points out, it's based on an intellectual sleight-of-hand (what he calls an "intuition pump"). From the linked article on the Stanford site: > Searle imagines himself alone in a room following a computer program for responding to Chinese characters slipped under the door. Searle understands nothing of Chinese, and yet, by following the program for manipulating symbols and numerals just as a computer does, he produces appropriate strings of Chinese characters that fool those outside into thinking there is a Chinese speaker in the room. [Emphasis added.] Unless those outside are satisfied with a very rudimentary back-and-forth, such a program would have to be amazingly complicated (and those outside very patient, or the operator superhumanly fast). It's not just a question of "look up input Chinese character and return corresponding output character" -- which is never explicitly stated, but which we're subconsciously led to by the image of a human "following the program for manipulating symbols and numerals". Dennett gives an example where the outside person tells a joke, and asks the room's operator to explain it. You could also imagine a reading comprehension exercise, with questions ranging from purely structural ("What is the third word on the fifth line?") through semantic ("What colour was the girl's dress?") to analytical ("Why do you think the boy was sad?") Questions can be self-referential, or depend on previous questions (and their answers) or on a vast mass of knowledge we take for granted (a dress the colour of snow is white; a small boy might cry if his kite gets stuck in a tree). It doesn't seem so intuitive that a system that complex lacks anything we might legitimately describe as "understanding".