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Everyone keeps saying that the leaks confirmed the backdoor (e.g. wikipedia claims that) but which leak exactly? I didn't see a leak which confirmed the Dual EC
by Someone1234 12y ago
Everyone keeps saying that the leaks confirmed the backdoor (e.g. wikipedia claims that) but which leak exactly? I didn't see a leak which confirmed the Dual EC DRBG backdoor. If someone did can you link it here?
PS - There may very well be a backdoor. In fact I believe that there is. But people keep claiming the Snowden leaks confirmed it, when I see no such confirmation.
- roywiggins 12y agoI believe it was proved that a backdoor did exist- that there's a private key which can be used to backdoor it- but not that the NSA actually held that key. But, who else would? https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_s... A leak confirmed that the NSA paid RSA to use that particular algorithm in BSAFE. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_BSAFE#Dual_EC_DRBG_backdoor http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_BSAFE#Dual_EC_DRBG_backdoor
- XorNot 12y ago"Believe". So not proof. There's a lot of that going around on this particular issue, and a subtle but important difference.
- xenophonf 12y agoInformation security is all about probabilities and risk estimation and cost-benefit analysis, so I don't think people's concerns surrounding Dual EC DRBG are unfounded. That the constants are suspect (regardless who could potentially possess the underlying keying material) and that its performance is worse than similar algorithms is enough risk for many to rationally decide to abandon it---no conspiracy theories required. NSA probably (j/k!!) didn't engineer the POODLE attack into SSLv3, but that's not stopping people from abandoning the protocol (and rightly so)---it's just too unsafe. That said, the spectre of the NSA's involvement in this should concern both US nationals and our colleagues overseas, for political reasons as much as---if not more than---technical ones.
- nullc 12y agoI'm pretty sure most people have taken the certicom patent on using this technique for "escrow" as pretty strong evidence that it was an intentional backdoor. Esp. coupled with its insanely slow performance and NSA's failure to point out that the selection of the 'random' numbers could be used to backdoor the cryptosystem. (especially when they continued to fail to point that out and support the cryptosystem while embargoing the patent for national security reasons). But indeed, I'm not aware of any stronger proof. ... but people go to jail on evidence less circumstantial than this all the time. How high a bar must be set before we can just say "backdoored" without a page of footnotes?
- scintill76 12y agoI basically agree with your conclusion, but it sounds like they did not embargo the patent: https://projectbullrun.org/dual-ec/patent.html https://projectbullrun.org/dual-ec/patent.html ("recommended against a secrecy order"). Or am I confused about the meaning? Anyway, it at least shows the NSA was institutionally aware of the possibility of backdooring, and other cryptographers knew about it, yet NSA pushed for its adoption.
- EthanHeilman 12y agoThe confirmation of the backdoor comes from internal NSA memos that journalists with access to the Snowden documents have read. The source documents have not been made public to my knowledge. "Classified N.S.A. memos appear to confirm that the fatal weakness, discovered by two Microsoft cryptographers in 2007, was engineered by the agency." -http://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption http://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-t...
- XorNot 12y agoAnd again - "appear to". They appear to? There's armies you could lose in the gaps of interpretation words like that allow. 'Appear to' covers everything from "NSA and DRBG mentioned in same document" to definitely not a statement like "the Dual EC-DRBG private key has not proven sufficiently useful in recovering useful intelligence and we're discontinuing the program" or some such.
- scintill76 12y ago> But internal memos leaked by a former N.S.A. contractor, Edward Snowden, suggest that the N.S.A. generated one of the random number generators used in a 2006 N.I.S.T. standard — called the Dual EC DRBG standard — which contains a back door for the N.S.A. In publishing the standard, N.I.S.T. acknowledged “contributions” from N.S.A., but not primary authorship. > Internal N.S.A. memos describe how the agency subsequently worked behind the scenes to push the same standard on the International Organization for Standardization. “The road to developing this standard was smooth once the journey began,” one memo noted. “However, beginning the journey was a challenge in finesse.” > At the time, Canada’s Communications Security Establishment ran the standards process for the international organization, but classified documents describe how ultimately the N.S.A. seized control. “After some behind-the-scenes finessing with the head of the Canadian national delegation and with C.S.E., the stage was set for N.S.A. to submit a rewrite of the draft,” the memo notes. “Eventually, N.S.A. became the sole editor.” [0] Yes, it's somewhat circumstantial, but pretty damning. If they weren't backdooring it, I'd like to hear an alternate explanation for why the NSA has memos about, in their own words, "behind-the-scenes finessing" to "become the sole editor" and "rewrite" an international standard. All that hard work quietly manipulating things to be just how they want them and, oopsie, the standard just might have a back door! Meanwhile, as described in other comments here, they paid RSA Security to deploy the standard; and were made aware of the possibility of a backdoor[1], but for whatever reason continued recommending its use. I'd entertain arguments that they were actually trying to strengthen it, as may have happened with DES, but in this case, they were pushing something that civilian contemporaries knew was dangerous. Malice or incompetence seem more likely than secret benevolence here. Or is there some other reasonable explanation I'm missing? [0] http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announces-steps-to-restore-confidence-on-encryption-standards/ http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announce... [1] https://projectbullrun.org/dual-ec/patent.html https://projectbullrun.org/dual-ec/patent.html