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Hopefully the last post I'll ever write on Dual EC DRBG
- bradleyjg 12y agoThe underlying letter http://www.ams.org//notices/201502/rnoti-p165.pdf http://www.ams.org//notices/201502/rnoti-p165.pdf carefully avoids saying whether or not the NSA put a backdoor into Dual EC DRBG. The language is several places seems to suggest it did not, but there is no outright denial (or acknowledgement).
- bkeroack 12y agoI imagine it's still classified, meaning nobody could admit it if they wanted to.
- throwaway87409 12y agoYup, http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35546.pdf http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35546.pdf
- csandreasen 12y agoIn a keynote speech, Richard "Dickie" George, former technical director for the NSA Information Assurance Director, flat out denied it claiming that they were non-deterministically generated random numbers[1]. He also talked a little bit about how Dual EC became a public standard to begin with[2]. If you have the time, I think the whole video is worth a watch - he goes into the history of DES, espionage between the US and Soviets, getting cryptographic equipment working in tanks, etc... [1] http://vimeo.com/97891042 http://vimeo.com/97891042 (jump to 57:53) [2] Same video, jump to 30:14
- bradleyjg 12y agoJust watched the whole video. Thanks for linked it.
- EthanHeilman 12y agoI just wrote a reponse to Dr. Wertheimer's letter looking some of the misleading statements[0]. [0]: http://ethanheilman.tumblr.com/post/108115952435/a-response-to-wertheimers-encryption-and-the-nsa http://ethanheilman.tumblr.com/post/108115952435/a-response-...
- Someone1234 12y agoEveryone keeps saying that the leaks confirmed the backdoor (e.g. wikipedia claims that) but which leak exactly? I didn't see a leak which confirmed the Dual EC DRBG backdoor. If someone did can you link it here? PS - There may very well be a backdoor. In fact I believe that there is. But people keep claiming the Snowden leaks confirmed it, when I see no such confirmation.
- roywiggins 12y agoI believe it was proved that a backdoor did exist- that there's a private key which can be used to backdoor it- but not that the NSA actually held that key. But, who else would? https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_s... A leak confirmed that the NSA paid RSA to use that particular algorithm in BSAFE. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_BSAFE#Dual_EC_DRBG_backdoor http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_BSAFE#Dual_EC_DRBG_backdoor
- XorNot 12y ago"Believe". So not proof. There's a lot of that going around on this particular issue, and a subtle but important difference.
- xenophonf 12y agoInformation security is all about probabilities and risk estimation and cost-benefit analysis, so I don't think people's concerns surrounding Dual EC DRBG are unfounded. That the constants are suspect (regardless who could potentially possess the underlying keying material) and that its performance is worse than similar algorithms is enough risk for many to rationally decide to abandon it---no conspiracy theories required. NSA probably (j/k!!) didn't engineer the POODLE attack into SSLv3, but that's not stopping people from abandoning the protocol (and rightly so)---it's just too unsafe. That said, the spectre of the NSA's involvement in this should concern both US nationals and our colleagues overseas, for political reasons as much as---if not more than---technical ones.
- 12y ago
- iwwr 12y agoSo right now, what are recommended public key, cyphers and hash functions for reasonable crypto safety? What about safe crypto pRNG's? The ubuntu's gpg lists the following: Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224
- Buge 12y agoWell definitely don't use MD5. And SHA1 and RIPEMD160 are too short to be considered fully collision resistant.
- xenophonf 12y agoFor starters, please refer to https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS. For SSH, I lack clear, good advice. I've tended to disable weaker ciphersuites using Mozilla's TLS configuration advice as a guide, and I've also tended to use larger key sizes than the defaults. As questionable as NIST's guidelines have been lately, I tend to follow the high end of their recommended key sizes, so 4096-byte public keys, etc.
- phunge 12y agoThis was some recent advice for SSH: https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.html https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.ht... It was on discussed on HN, at the time noone pointed out anything glaring about the advice given.
- PhantomGremlin 12y agoThat's a nice link, thanks. I like the writing style. Clear advice, with explanations, not too wordy. Do you have a pointer to the HN discussion?
- jzwinck 12y agoIt was discussed here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8843994 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8843994
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- 0x0 12y agoPlease don't hijack pinch-to-zoom gestures with javascript that loads random articles on your blog. (iOS mobilesafari). Thanks.
- throwaway7746 12y agoI'd be interested in hearing tptaceks response here, as he has claimed in his past comments that "no serious cryptographer" believes dual-EC-DRBG was backdoored. Is Matthew Green not a "serious cryptographer"?