Makes sense. At that point it's probably easier to find another part of the software stack to attack instead of the secrets itself. E.g. instead of getting the

Makes sense. At that point it's probably easier to find another part of the software stack to attack instead of the secrets itself. E.g. instead of getting the keys to the kingdom, just exploit a weakness in some signing software. Reminds me of that Microsoft certificate signing service for remote desktop (or something like that) for the feds (okay, maybe not but still...) that ended up generating certificates that would pass Windows Update checks for from-Microsoft validity. Google reminds me it was called "Flame". Ah, here it is: http://www.securityweek.com/microsoft-unauthorized-certificate-was-used-sign-flame-malware http://www.securityweek.com/microsoft-unauthorized-certifica... And it was revealed roughly a year before we learned about PRISM and such.