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Actually, getting rid of cookies would fit almost all HTTP requests into a single packet, so there are tangible technical benefits, even without the privacy ben

by phkamp 12y ago

Actually, getting rid of cookies would fit almost all HTTP requests into a single packet, so there are tangible technical benefits, even without the privacy benefits. You seem confused about cryptography. Against NSA we only need secrecy, privacy is not required. Likewise integrity does not require secrecy, but authentication (which doesn't require secrecy either). You don't think that anybody can figure out what you are doing when you open a TCP connection to queue.acm.org right after they posted a new article, even if that connection is encrypted ? Really ? How stupid do you think NSA is ? Have you never heard of meta-data collection ? And if you like your encrypted connections so much, you should review at the certs built into your browser: That's who you trust. I'll argue that's not materially better than unencrypted HTTP. (See also Operation Orchestra, I don't think you perceive the scale of what NSA is doing)

bad_user 12y ago
The line on secrecy vs privacy doesn't make sense. Actually help me out, because I'm not a native English speaker - if you're implying that the NSA should be able to snoop in on my traffic without a warrant, as long as it keeps it secret, then I beg to differ. Visiting an article doesn't happen only after it was posted. And surely the NSA can certainly figure out ways to track you, but their cost will be higher. Just like with fancy door locks and alarm systems, making it harder for thieves to break in means the probability of it happening drops. Imperfect solutions are still way better than no protections at all (common fallacy nr 1). All such rants are also ignoring that local threats are much more immediate and relevant than the NSA (common fallacy nr 2). On trusting the certificate authorities built into my browser, of course, but then again this is a client-side issue, not one that can be fixed by HTTP 2.0 and we do have certificate pinning and even alternatives championed by means of browser add-ons. Against the NSA, nothing is perfect of course, unless you're doing client-side PGP encryption on a machine not connected to the Internet. But then again, that's unrelated to the topic of HTTP/2.0.
- phkamp 12y ago
  With unencrypted HTTP, NSA can just grab the packets on the fiber and search for any keyword they want. With a self-signed cert they would have to do a Man In The Middle attack on you to see your traffic. They don't have the capacity (or ability! man of their fibertaps are passive) to do that to all the traffic at all the time. The problem with making a CA-blessed cert a requirement for all or even most of the traffic, is that it forces the NSA to break SSL/TLS or CAs definitively, otherwise they cannot do their job. Fundamentally this is a political problem, just slapping encryption on traffic will not solve it. But it can shift the economy of the situation -- but you should think carefully what way you shift it.
  - cesarb 12y ago
    > The problem with making a CA-blessed cert a requirement for all or even most of the traffic, is that it forces the NSA to break SSL/TLS or CAs definitively, otherwise they cannot do their job. Isn't the whole point of pervasive authenticated encryption to prevent the NSA from "doing their job" (at least the spying part of it)? > But it can shift the economy of the situation -- but you should think carefully what way you shift it. It shifts more than the economy of the situation. It also forces a shift from passive attacks to active attacks, which are easier to detect and harder to justify. Forcing the attacker to justify their acts has a political effect.
    - zzzcpan 12y ago
      > Forcing the attacker to justify their acts has a political effect. Which essentially means that terrorists and pedophiles are gonna be using encryption to harm the kids and browsers will have to obey to a new wonderful kids-protecting law and add a backdoor.
    - phkamp 12y ago
      Pervasive authenticated encryption will not prevent the NSA from doing their job, as long as lawmakers think they should do their job. Instead you will see key-escrow laws or even bans on encryption. You cannot solve the political problem by applying encryption.

by phkamp 12y ago

bad_user 12y ago

The line on secrecy vs privacy doesn't make sense. Actually help me out, because I'm not a native English speaker - if you're implying that the NSA should be able to snoop in on my traffic without a warrant, as long as it keeps it secret, then I beg to differ. Visiting an article doesn't happen only after it was posted. And surely the NSA can certainly figure out ways to track you, but their cost will be higher. Just like with fancy door locks and alarm systems, making it harder for thieves to break in means the probability of it happening drops. Imperfect solutions are still way better than no protections at all (common fallacy nr 1). All such rants are also ignoring that local threats are much more immediate and relevant than the NSA (common fallacy nr 2). On trusting the certificate authorities built into my browser, of course, but then again this is a client-side issue, not one that can be fixed by HTTP 2.0 and we do have certificate pinning and even alternatives championed by means of browser add-ons. Against the NSA, nothing is perfect of course, unless you're doing client-side PGP encryption on a machine not connected to the Internet. But then again, that's unrelated to the topic of HTTP/2.0.

phkamp 12y ago
With unencrypted HTTP, NSA can just grab the packets on the fiber and search for any keyword they want. With a self-signed cert they would have to do a Man In The Middle attack on you to see your traffic. They don't have the capacity (or ability! man of their fibertaps are passive) to do that to all the traffic at all the time. The problem with making a CA-blessed cert a requirement for all or even most of the traffic, is that it forces the NSA to break SSL/TLS or CAs definitively, otherwise they cannot do their job. Fundamentally this is a political problem, just slapping encryption on traffic will not solve it. But it can shift the economy of the situation -- but you should think carefully what way you shift it.
- cesarb 12y ago
  > The problem with making a CA-blessed cert a requirement for all or even most of the traffic, is that it forces the NSA to break SSL/TLS or CAs definitively, otherwise they cannot do their job. Isn't the whole point of pervasive authenticated encryption to prevent the NSA from "doing their job" (at least the spying part of it)? > But it can shift the economy of the situation -- but you should think carefully what way you shift it. It shifts more than the economy of the situation. It also forces a shift from passive attacks to active attacks, which are easier to detect and harder to justify. Forcing the attacker to justify their acts has a political effect.
  - zzzcpan 12y ago
    > Forcing the attacker to justify their acts has a political effect. Which essentially means that terrorists and pedophiles are gonna be using encryption to harm the kids and browsers will have to obey to a new wonderful kids-protecting law and add a backdoor.
  - phkamp 12y ago
    Pervasive authenticated encryption will not prevent the NSA from doing their job, as long as lawmakers think they should do their job. Instead you will see key-escrow laws or even bans on encryption. You cannot solve the political problem by applying encryption.