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I would assume the larger purpose of IME is actually exactly as a platform for persistent undetectable system compromise. Purpose built for TAO? As conspiracy t
by zaroth 12y ago
I would assume the larger purpose of IME is actually exactly as a platform for persistent undetectable system compromise. Purpose built for TAO? As conspiracy theories go it's hard to explain the existence and full capabilities of IME in this decade without some NSA involvement.
- acdha 12y agoPlease take the conspiracist nattering somewhere else. As explained in the second paragraph of the article, the features of IME were requested by large corporate IT departments and pushed mainstream by marketing pressure, with the addition of DRM bits as requested by the large tech vendors who need them to negotiate licenses with members of the copyright cartel. You look at this and see a secure rootkit. A corporate IT worker looks at this and thinks that they can image a workstation remotely no matter what's currently installed. A security person looks at this and sees secure base platform starting from TPM on down which can be setup to keep malware from irrecoverably compromising the system (remember the recent Thunderstrike discussion noting that TPM would protect against that firmware exploit?). All of these have tradeoffs which can be debated but it's just silly to pretend that the NSA is centrally directing the entire industry.
- zaroth 12y agoWhat impressed me the most was how it's not only hard-coded, but that it can still reliably halt the system even when forcibly disabled. If only it could be fully and truly disabled in the BIOS, or even better, isolated as a separate SKU, then I would be much less irate about it's existence. You can literally wipe all configuration from NVRAM and the platform is still available for "zero-touch remote configuration". This truly is a PC beside the PC. The level of complexity is astounding; they built everything but a way to turn it off.
- zaroth 12y agoAnyone who requested the feature of "able to send and receive packets which are not seen by the OS" is either not really asking, or should be told no. I mean, even if I have a pfSense or whatever box running in between, if I'm reading this correctly, there could be packets traversing the network I can't see? And all of this has a "zero-touch" configuration capability. You know what that means, right? The two together, simply put, it's a factor to consider when buying this hardware. People should be aware this feature exists, and what it's capable of. More than anything, it feels like this is unreported and under-discussed.
- acdha 12y agoYou're misunderstanding is what's going on here: if you need something like lights-out management, which is a requirement in any decent large IT shop, you by definition have a separate processor running its own operating system. That's the whole point: you can use this to power on the machine and initiate something like a software install when it has no existing OS install or a severely broken one. Since that needs network access you either have the expense of needing separate NICs and ports – common in the server space – or having some way for it to share the NIC with the primary OS, which is popular because it costs significantly less and doesn't require wiring two ports for every computer. It's the latter capability which gives it the ability to send packets without the knowledge of the main OS since the traffic isn't processed by it in any way. Again: this certainly could be abused but the capability originated for quite benign reasons – every large organization with an even marginally competent IT department wants the ability to do things like reinstall a system without having to pay to send a tech on-site to hit a couple of keys.
- zaroth 12y agoI understand perfectly well the IT requirements. However, capabilities which originate for quite benign reasons but which allow complete, persistent, and undetectable system compromise are typically called "bugs". For example, I don't have any issue with remote power control. A secure form of Wake-on-LAN is wonderful, as long as the public keys are fully enumerable and totally under operator control, and the feature can be decisively disabled if desired. To your point about packet processing, to keep with the Wake-on-LAN example, it's perfectly easy to share a physical port and keep the traffic fully visible to the OS as well as a separate processor. If a remote party has permission to completely own my system, I want to see their name (public key) listed every time the machine boots, like the warning you get any time you access a government system; You are accessing a [Company Name] information system, which includes (1) this computer, (2) this computer network, (3) all computers connected to this network, and (4) all devices and storage media attached to this network or to a computer on this network. This information system is provided for [Company]-authorized use only. Unauthorized or improper use or access of this system may result in disciplinary action, as well as civil and criminal penalties. By using this information system, you understand and consent to the following: You have no reasonable expectation of privacy when you use this information system; this includes any communications or data transiting or stored on this information system. At any time, and for any lawful government purpose, the government may, without notice, monitor, intercept, search and seize any communication or data transiting or stored on this information system. The government may disclose or use any communications or data transiting or stored on this information system for any lawful government purpose, including but not limited to law enforcement purposes. Such a warning, requiring an 'I Agree' click at each boot, would adequately explain the risks to end-users of having such a component active on their system. But apparently, the more common practice is to hide the prompt at startup (typically Ctrl-P) to enter the MEBx Configuration screens behind another BIOS setting. I'm not an expert at vPro or Intel AMT by any stretch, but upon cursory investigation, it appears the trust model (a.k.a all you need to completely own a system) is an easily obtainable certificate, and control over the DNS and DHCP server. It looks like the only thing that protects a system beyond this is a vendor-specific "remote configuration timeout" which would have to be reset by a local agent after it has expired. [2, 3] However, some Intel documentation claims that TLS-PKI "...allows a client system to be provisioned with zero physical interaction. Remote configuration is ideal for systems that have already been deployed into an environment..." which implies some way to overcome the remote configuration timeout... (See 'Alternate Path #2' on footnote #5) [1] - https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2009/10/07/intel-amt-and-remote-provisioning-aka-zero-touch https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2009/10/07/intel-amt-... [2] - http://h10032.www1.hp.com/ctg/Manual/c03455054.pdf http://h10032.www1.hp.com/ctg/Manual/c03455054.pdf [3] - https://communities.intel.com/docs/DOC-1989#SECFAQ8 https://communities.intel.com/docs/DOC-1989#SECFAQ8 [4] - http://downloadmirror.intel.com/21729/eng/RemoteConfigurationCertificateSelection.pdf http://downloadmirror.intel.com/21729/eng/RemoteConfiguratio... [5] - https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-amt-use-case-11-remote-configuration https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-amt-use-case...