2 ms·
This privacy risk is actually documented in the official HSTS specification, section 16.9 of https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797.txt https://www.rfc-editor.
by schoen 12y ago
This privacy risk is actually documented in the official HSTS specification, section 16.9 of
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797.txt https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797.txt
However, the spec doesn't propose a mitigation for it. I'm afraid many new security policy mechanisms can actually be used to track users or devices this way, because you can experiment to see whether the browser has heard about a particular security policy by observing its behavior when you ask it to violate the policy. If you tell different devices about different policies, their behavior will be different (as if you told different kids who were going to visit a park about different rules for how to behave in the park, and then observed who obeyed and who violated which rules as a way of identifying individual kids).
For example, you can also get tracking out of public key pinning, by selectively pinning certs for some subdomains and not others, and then seeing which subresources are successfully loaded when you present a huge number of pin violations. (I think that's also documented in the HPKP spec.)
- schoen 12y agoThe HPKP tracking problem is described in section 5 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/?include_text=1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinni... which also includes another description of this HSTS problem.
- f- 12y agoWe also have a pretty comprehensive discussion of this and many other vectors in: http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/client-identification-mechanisms http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/client-identi...
- schoen 12y agoThanks, I didn't know about that article.
- derf_ 12y agoSee also the Firefox bug from 2011: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=648186 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=648186