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That’s the idea of an infinite number of onion layers [1]. What I find intriguing is that if you assume that everything is based on cause and effect, then (I th
by rndn 12y ago
That’s the idea of an infinite number of onion layers [1]. What I find intriguing is that if you assume that everything is based on cause and effect, then (I think) you necessarily run into an infinite regress problem (the cause of a cause of a cause …) unless you define some "uncaused cause", or the concept of causation breaks down at some point.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_everything#Infinite_number_of_onion_layers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_everything#Infinite_...
- JadeNB 12y ago> What I find intriguing is that if you assume that everything is based on cause and effect, then (I think) you necessarily run into an infinite regress problem (the cause of a cause of a cause …) unless you define some "uncaused cause", or the concept of causation breaks down at some point. Another possible resolution is a cyclic picture (something like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclic_model https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclic_model), in which the cause of the cause of the cause of … may be the original event.
- rndn 12y agoIsn’t that an infinite regress problem?
- JadeNB 12y ago> Isn’t that an infinite regress problem? I can certainly see the sense in which it might be said to be, but I think that's not the sense in which the term is originally meant. I tried to come up with an explanation of why I think they were meaningfully different by an appeal to mathematical analogy, but I'm not sure that it's convincing. Fermat argued as follows: a positive integer solution to `x^4 + y^4 = z^4` could always be converted into a smaller such solution, and you can't produce ever-smaller positive integers forever, so there weren't any such solutions in the first place. I'd say that this is clearly an infinite regress (though it was actually called infinite descent). On the other hand, consider the problem of subtracting 1. In the system of ordinary (not-necessarily-positive) integers, this leads to a (non-paradoxical) infinite regress; whereas, in the system of integers modulo some fixed positive integer, it leads to a (non-paradoxical) circularity (where repeatedly subtracting 1 from a number will eventually yield that number itself). I think that it is reasonable to call these different phenomena.
- hasenj 12y agoCyclic causality is even more troublesome than infinite regress. I find myself leaning towards causation breaking down at some point. Just like our concepts of "position" and "momentum" break down at the quantum level.
- noobermin 12y agoYou say that causa sui or at least cyclic cause is troublesome without saying why. I'm curious for your reasoning.
- Steuard 12y agoI certainly didn't intend to suggest that an infinite number of theoretical layers might be necessary to explain nature (though I suppose I can't rule it out). Everything in my comment was meant to be compatible with (to take one example) the possibility that some particular well-defined refinement of string theory turns out to be the ultimate theory of nature, and only variations in local conditions are unpredictable. (This is meant in much the same way that the well established laws of gravitation, electromagnetism, and nuclear physics will give rise to very diverse solar systems.) There are interesting questions in many multiverse models about the history and origin of the universe, and I've seen people express concerns about the possibility of "infinite history" in much the same words you've used here. But that's a different issue than Smolin's notion of infinitely many layers of theory being needed to keep the cosmic machinery running. Personally, I'm not overly bothered by the notion of space and time existing forever in both directions, with new bubbles of interesting reality occasionally spawning themselves from the remnants of the old ones at random after uncounted eons of darkness. I don't know why that structure might exist rather than something else (or why there is something rather than nothing), but positing a "first cause" wouldn't make me any more satisfied (and would raise additional questions). I think modern math and science are more comfortable with the possibility of infinity than folks used to be, and that our notion of a "cause" is rather different. (When I think of "causality", all I think about are light cones and Cauchy problems: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cauchy_problem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cauchy_problem .)