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So, what do we do if we live in a world where it's impossible to prevent this type of thing? Is there anything we can do? Or just keep plugging holes as they c
by ars 12y ago
So, what do we do if we live in a world where it's impossible to prevent this type of thing?
Is there anything we can do? Or just keep plugging holes as they come up?
For example I no longer expect my email address not to leak - it doesn't matter who you send it to (which company or person) eventually it will leak. There are only a few rare exceptions, which is the opposite of the kind of world you want, but it's the reality.
For email, instead of concealing the address we focus on filtering the spam.
Is there something that can be done for passwords? Personal information? Other things?
- higherpurpose 12y agoPassword managers such as Lastpass along with a 2-factor auth for each user should be pretty good (preferably not SMS-based as these can be relatively easily bypassed with SS7 access, but based on Yubikey-like hardware tokens or such). Also, after these hacks I would hope most companies will be considering adopting end-to-end email and chat encryption policies ASAP, to protect sensitive information (such as the dealings between Sony and MPAA) from getting out in such a leak - even if that means the top execs not having access to everyone's emails and chats anymore. Right now most companies prefer to spy on their employees, which makes them highly vulnerable to this type of leak in case of a hack. It also proves the point that surveillance is a bad "cybersecurity" policy (NSA and most other "security" agencies believe it's the solution to hacking, somehow). They might want to reconsider that and encrypt everything end-to-end. They also need to compartmentalize a lot more. You can't have a "network of 50,000 computers" in a company, like I think Sony had. I also believe it's already quite common for large corporations to have employees access the Internet only through a VM along with solid whitelisting policies (although I'm pretty sure Sony didn't do that and there are probably many more like them). So yeah, I think the main point would be to keep security as close to an individual employee as possible, as opposed to having everything accessed company-wide, with virtually no protections within the network itself, just outside of it.
- MichaelApproved 12y agoWhat happens when lastpass gets hacked?
- vosper 12y agoI don't store my critical passwords in LastPass. So my email and banking passwords are not there. So I have to remember 4 passwords: 1 x email, 2 x bank, 1 x LastPass. That's not so bad, and means that if LastPass is hacked I can still reset everything.
- rlvesco7 12y agoIn theory, your passwords are encrypted locally before they are uploaded. They claim that they are unable to see your passwords. That said, they are right next door to Langley, VA so who knows.
- MichaelApproved 12y agoHow is that possible when they allow you to share passwords with other people?
- jdsnape 12y agoI think a slight change in approach is needed. In a lot of cases, your network had a hard outer perimeter which was treated as unbreakable, and within that was considered 'trusted'. I think we're now finding that doesn't scale very well as it only takes one hole and it's broken. It's better to treat the network as some level of 'untrusted' and protect your servers/computers better as individual units accordingly.
- marak830 12y agoThis. I think its definatly time we started treating our internal networks as unsafe. Not as easier for the end user, but if done correctly a lot safer for everyone. A little depressing, but its what would have had to happen eventually.
- calpaterson 12y ago"De-perimeterisation" in security-ese https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De-perimeterisation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De-perimeterisation
- hga 12y agoIn military terms, it's switching from a crust defense (the perimeter) to defense in depth. There are situations where the former can make sense, such as a siege, where e.g. a penetration is quickly obvious and you can use your interior lines of communications to rush reserves to the action. The key, of course, is the "quickly obvious". Prior to the stats of the art allowing that (which sounds difficult and painful in principle), defense in depth is obviously the way to go. But you've got to achive it in some why where e.g. compromise of "bob@nvidia.com" + password doesn't quickly get you past any defense, or any that's relevant to bob.
- niels_olson 12y agoThe military's defense in depth can get crazy though. Without going into details, the smart people you want to do interesting things frequently end up so severely hamstrung they give up before starting.
- harshreality 12y agoStop reusing passwords 2-factor Network compartmentalization. For example, in the Sony Pictures hack, why does HR's network need to be accessible from the same internal network that everyone else is on?
- tmm 12y agowhy does HR's network need to be accessible from the same internal network that everyone else is on? Convenience I guess. Every book I've ever seen on network design and system administration talks about "departmental" servers and segmenting corporate networks at functional borders, but in practice I've never seen it. It's hard enough to get people to use different network shares for different data (e.g. personal, departmental, project related) instead of one global, world-writable share. This occurs at every level, from small businesses to the largest corporate and government networks. On top of that, even if you compartmentalize, there really isn't any technical method to prevent Sally in HR from emailing a list of personal email addresses, phone numbers and addresses to Sam in the Communications department so he can send out Christmas cards to everyone. And, Sally being a non-technical user will probably just "hide" the social security and salary columns in that spreadsheet instead of deleting them and then will blame Bob in IT when that list of salaries ends up on the global network share and eventually printed out and taped to the wall in the hallway.
- Meekro 12y agoThe internet is still very young, and I'd like to think that we will learn to do better. Most systems are already much more resilient than they were 10 years ago. Things like Ubuntu's auto-updates are making the average web server more secure. Specialization is also starting to play more of a role. Various hosting and cloud companies have pitched themselves as experts in security, and large ones like Amazon have never been hacked directly. Companies that specialize in something other than IT (like Sony) can rely on cloud firms' expertise rather than trying to figure it out themselves (and repeating past mistakes in the process). Software companies also put a higher priority on security than ever before. New software like Google Chrome is setting a high standard for security, and insecure stuff like Adobe Flash is shunned. It's increasingly obvious that even the best programmers in the world can't always write secure C software, but new memory-managed languages are playing a greater role. Google's Go is quickly being adopted to write software that runs anywhere, nearly as fast as C, but with proper memory management. I could provide more examples, but my point is that we're doing more than playing whack-a-mole with the exploit of the day. We've invented (and widely deployed) new ideas that make things permanently better, and there are more such ideas in the pipeline. Call me an optimist, but I think we will see massive improvements over the next few decades.