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>We don't like this, but the implementations to secure DNS (DANE, etc.) DANE is just another half-assed semi-solution that shifts the trust problem around a bi
by wyager 12y ago
>We don't like this, but the implementations to secure DNS (DANE, etc.)
DANE is just another half-assed semi-solution that shifts the trust problem around a bit.
A really good solution requires huge infrastructure change. The only currently viable solution to Zooko's Triangle is Namecoin (or a similar technology).
It is not possible to forcibly change a Namecoin entry via legal channels.
- roywiggins 12y agoCan't you just order the owner of the namecoin entry to transfer it? You can't seize it, but you can seize the -owner-, if you can find them. If I have control of "microsoft.bit" I assume Microsoft would be within their rights to sue me for trademark infringement. This is better than the FBI's (apparently legal?) ability to seize .com domains en masse, but still.
- wyager 12y agoOf course. There's no defense against "rubber hose cryptanalysis". However, it's trivial to hide ownership of namecoin domains, or to share ownership among geographically disparate parties.
- sarciszewski 12y agoI'm actually working on a toy project specification that involves: - Tor Hidden Services - Onionimbus (basically tor2web + DNS) - Namecoin - node-webkit All to make an anonymous desktop publishing suite to encourage diversity in the darknet, and to encourage anonymous and decentralized publishing in general.
- wolfgke 12y ago> The only currently viable solution to Zooko's Triangle is Namecoin (or a similar technology). Quoting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle: "Following Namecoin, other platforms were developed which defy Zooko's conjecture, such as Twister.".