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DNS is insecure. We know this, and we work around it (hence, TLS). We don't like this, but the implementations to secure DNS (DANE, etc.) leave a bad taste in s

DNS is insecure. We know this, and we work around it (hence, TLS). We don't like this, but the implementations to secure DNS (DANE, etc.) leave a bad taste in security experts' mouths. Attacking DNS with legal pressure isn't something the security industry doesn't already consider. DNS censorship is on of the motivations for using Tor, VPNs, etc. This is a legal and political conflict, not a technical one.

wyager 12y ago
>We don't like this, but the implementations to secure DNS (DANE, etc.) DANE is just another half-assed semi-solution that shifts the trust problem around a bit. A really good solution requires huge infrastructure change. The only currently viable solution to Zooko's Triangle is Namecoin (or a similar technology). It is not possible to forcibly change a Namecoin entry via legal channels.
- roywiggins 12y ago
  Can't you just order the owner of the namecoin entry to transfer it? You can't seize it, but you can seize the -owner-, if you can find them. If I have control of "microsoft.bit" I assume Microsoft would be within their rights to sue me for trademark infringement. This is better than the FBI's (apparently legal?) ability to seize .com domains en masse, but still.
  - wyager 12y ago
    Of course. There's no defense against "rubber hose cryptanalysis". However, it's trivial to hide ownership of namecoin domains, or to share ownership among geographically disparate parties.
- sarciszewski 12y ago
  I'm actually working on a toy project specification that involves: - Tor Hidden Services - Onionimbus (basically tor2web + DNS) - Namecoin - node-webkit All to make an anonymous desktop publishing suite to encourage diversity in the darknet, and to encourage anonymous and decentralized publishing in general.
- wolfgke 12y ago
  > The only currently viable solution to Zooko's Triangle is Namecoin (or a similar technology). Quoting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle: "Following Namecoin, other platforms were developed which defy Zooko's conjecture, such as Twister.".

wyager 12y ago

>We don't like this, but the implementations to secure DNS (DANE, etc.) DANE is just another half-assed semi-solution that shifts the trust problem around a bit. A really good solution requires huge infrastructure change. The only currently viable solution to Zooko's Triangle is Namecoin (or a similar technology). It is not possible to forcibly change a Namecoin entry via legal channels.

roywiggins 12y ago
Can't you just order the owner of the namecoin entry to transfer it? You can't seize it, but you can seize the -owner-, if you can find them. If I have control of "microsoft.bit" I assume Microsoft would be within their rights to sue me for trademark infringement. This is better than the FBI's (apparently legal?) ability to seize .com domains en masse, but still.
- wyager 12y ago
  Of course. There's no defense against "rubber hose cryptanalysis". However, it's trivial to hide ownership of namecoin domains, or to share ownership among geographically disparate parties.
sarciszewski 12y ago
I'm actually working on a toy project specification that involves: - Tor Hidden Services - Onionimbus (basically tor2web + DNS) - Namecoin - node-webkit All to make an anonymous desktop publishing suite to encourage diversity in the darknet, and to encourage anonymous and decentralized publishing in general.
wolfgke 12y ago
> The only currently viable solution to Zooko's Triangle is Namecoin (or a similar technology). Quoting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle: "Following Namecoin, other platforms were developed which defy Zooko's conjecture, such as Twister.".