4 ms·

rms doesn't have the Loongson netbook anymore, he rolls with a Gluglug X60 now I believe.

morganvachon 12y ago
Thanks for that, I'll have to look into that device and see what it's all about. Edit: So it's an off the shelf Thinkpad X60 with fully open source software? I thought that was something he was wary of, given his stance on Intel's partially closed designs. Also, wouldn't the TPM chip be an obstacle given the privacy concerns surrounding it raised by RMS himself?[1] From what I saw from the gluglug website, there is no mention of removing or disabling the TPM module, though I suppose one could remove it from the board themselves after purchase. [1]: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.html
- dublinben 12y ago
  From my understanding, you can disable the TPM by removing the kernel driver and any other drivers. The X60 is the last Thinkpad model in which it lives in a separate chip.
  - morganvachon 12y ago
    Is it really disabled though? The hardware is still there unless you extract the chip itself. For example, Intel's AMT exists at a level so far below the software and UEFI/BIOS that you can have just power and Ethernet/wifi plugged into the board, and it will "phone home" if it is configured to. Boards with GSM modules can even be controlled remotely via SMS commands. I realize that TPM and AMT are completely different animals, but AMT shows us that a low level "security" device on board can potentially mean compromised privacy and loss of control.
- pgeorgi 12y ago
  The TPM can be fully controlled by the user (or ignored altogether). Much misinformation about the TPM stems from the Anderson paper, which mixed up real TPM implementation and then-future Palladium concepts and claimed that this all runs in contemporary TPM chips. In reality, TPM is a chip with (rather slow) crypto functionality and a reasonable secure storage whose content can be "sealed" to certain system states. That state information is pushed to the TPM by the host system, since the TPM is a fully passive component. (Exception: new Intel chipsets feature 'Boot Guard' where the chipset pushes some root trust information to the TPM in a way that code on the CPU can't modify - but the TPM is still passive) If you control the firmware, you can build a reasonably secure environment using the TPM. But coreboot (or its libreboot distribution) by default don't even do that with the TPM.

Thanks for that, I'll have to look into that device and see what it's all about. Edit: So it's an off the shelf Thinkpad X60 with fully open source software? I thought that was something he was wary of, given his stance on Intel's partially closed designs. Also, wouldn't the TPM chip be an obstacle given the privacy concerns surrounding it raised by RMS himself?[1] From what I saw from the gluglug website, there is no mention of removing or disabling the TPM module, though I suppose one could remove it from the board themselves after purchase. [1]: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.html

dublinben 12y ago
From my understanding, you can disable the TPM by removing the kernel driver and any other drivers. The X60 is the last Thinkpad model in which it lives in a separate chip.
- morganvachon 12y ago
  Is it really disabled though? The hardware is still there unless you extract the chip itself. For example, Intel's AMT exists at a level so far below the software and UEFI/BIOS that you can have just power and Ethernet/wifi plugged into the board, and it will "phone home" if it is configured to. Boards with GSM modules can even be controlled remotely via SMS commands. I realize that TPM and AMT are completely different animals, but AMT shows us that a low level "security" device on board can potentially mean compromised privacy and loss of control.
pgeorgi 12y ago
The TPM can be fully controlled by the user (or ignored altogether). Much misinformation about the TPM stems from the Anderson paper, which mixed up real TPM implementation and then-future Palladium concepts and claimed that this all runs in contemporary TPM chips. In reality, TPM is a chip with (rather slow) crypto functionality and a reasonable secure storage whose content can be "sealed" to certain system states. That state information is pushed to the TPM by the host system, since the TPM is a fully passive component. (Exception: new Intel chipsets feature 'Boot Guard' where the chipset pushes some root trust information to the TPM in a way that code on the CPU can't modify - but the TPM is still passive) If you control the firmware, you can build a reasonably secure environment using the TPM. But coreboot (or its libreboot distribution) by default don't even do that with the TPM.