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Not at all. Given the history of TLS implementations, I would call "There are exploitable vulnerabilities" the null hypothesis, and require extraordinary proof
by Decade 12y ago
Not at all. Given the history of TLS implementations, I would call "There are exploitable vulnerabilities" the null hypothesis, and require extraordinary proof that a particular TLS implementation doesn't have vulnerabilities.
- nl 12y agoPerhaps, but this is an academic security researcher we are talking about. To generalise massively, academics are very deliberate and conservative in their language. If he wasn't aware of at least one unreported exploitable vulnerability then I would expect him to say "There are almost certainly still other, unreported vulnerabilities".
- Intermernet 12y agoAs an academic, he has probably verified that the underlying algorithms are as sound as claimed. Problems like Heartbleed come from implementation errors. Implementations are very prone to error, so there are almost certainly still other, unreported vulnerabilities. From the article, it would seem that side-stepping this, and going directly for the routers, or even the employees, is more efficient in actually circumventing encryption than hunting for vulnerabilities in encryption implementations.
- tedunangst 12y agoI don't think the crypto engineering blog is where Prof. Green publishes his very conservative academic writing. It's a blog, not a refereed paper.
- tptacek 12y agoHis academic communication mostly happens on Twitter.