There are a number of factual errors in this article. It may be presented as fact, but it is mostly an opinion piece with facts wrapped in. I'm speaking as a v

There are a number of factual errors in this article. It may be presented as fact, but it is mostly an opinion piece with facts wrapped in. I'm speaking as a veteran; my MOS was 13F (forward observer), and I was regularly attached to infantry units. First, in training up for Iraq, soldiers were trained on house-to-house clearing operations and urban warfare operations -- not in the long distance 'open field' operations the author seems to indicate. While the Army does have large scale operational training (at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, CA), soldiers also went through a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, which emphasized urban operations. These operations take place in much, much smaller distances than needed for a long rifle; and any soldier carrying an M16 wished for an M4. As far as not having the same amount of accuracy -- the author is correct, but at 300+ meters, most line soldiers (including infantryman) can't hit the target but 2 times out of 10 anyway. We simply do not train to try to hit a target at 300+ meters. The silhouettes we would shoot at even depict an enemy soldier standing up at 300 meters, which tells you how ludicrous such a thing is. "Someone's firing at me, let me stand up!" That's the first factual error the author makes; claiming 'most' engagements take place at long distances (read: "an especially serious disadvantage in modern combat, which is increasingly taking place over long ranges."). Even with an M16, a soldier does not want to engage something that far away and waste their ammunition -- at best they'll lay suppressing fire and try to get in closer and flank the enemy. The author then goes on to blame the weapon's issues on its construction -- he's right. It does need to be cleaned and maintained. We were always told, if you have five minutes, clean your weapon. Clean it. Clean it. Clean it. The author then states that an AK47 can fire at twice the rate an M4/M16 an. He's right. That would be a problem if the American soldier were trained to fire indiscriminately; but they are not. They're trained in firing precisely; and only to fire extraneous rounds when needed (like to lay covering or suppressive fire). The author points out that "today's soldier" wants a modular weapon. Rails systems are really cool; and they're really useful -- but not every soldier needs such a thing, and even infantry soldiers don't need One Weapon To Rule Them All. That's what got the JSF in trouble -- it tried to be everything to everyone. Soldiers need different weapons for different purposes; yes it's "Cool" to be able to swap out parts between weapons (and in battle, probably a requirement) but it's folly to think that one soldier would even be issued parts that weren't directly necessary for their MOS and position in their unit. A soldier isn't saying, "Man, I wish I had a 7.62 because I'd love to fire 400+ meters", they're saying, "Man, I wish I had a 7.62 because I want to make sure when I hit something, it's dead." The author again plays the distance card -- that's not on the minds of your average soldier (if it were, more soldiers would use telescopic scopes). There are good reasons why soldiers don't use computerized sights -- they break. Invariably they break at the wrong moment, like when you just fell into a hole you didn't see at 3am on a moonless night, when you were issued single sight Night vision goggles because the binocular NVGs are only given to squad leaders. The author is correct about the problem: We need a new weapon that is durable and able to be modularized. The author just gets the details wrong.