6 ms·
This would be a good time to wait and let security professionals analyze the documents and take what you read in this article lightly, as I've found a number of
by dmix 12y ago
This would be a good time to wait and let security professionals analyze the documents and take what you read in this article lightly, as I've found a number of sensationalist examples.
For example, they claim Canada is monitoring hockey sites:
> Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSEC) even monitors sites devoted to the country's national pastime: "We have noticed a large increase in chat activity on the hockeytalk sites. This is likely due to the beginning of playoff season," it says in one presentation.
But if you look at the actual slide https://i.imgur.com/2GO8H6L.png https://i.imgur.com/2GO8H6L.png, it is clearly a fake sample report of what a real one might look like. It even uses the name 'Canukistan' as the country name.
There are 44 slide decks, one of the biggest leaks so far. It will take time to make sense of the noise. And any misinformation from reporting by non-technical journalists doesn't help the cause.
- nsansansa 12y ago> reporting by non-technical journalists doesn't help the cause non-technical journalists Ever heard of a certain Jacob Appelbaum?
- acqq 12y agoThat guy you mention in spite of his very technical background also avoided the technical details and possibly also tried to sensationalize: I was worried as he claimed that the SSH is broken, but it seems that there is no document that states that for the passive capture of the SSH traffic (at least the documents are there and everybody can analyse them). However we already knew for a while that the active attacks are being done: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/07/north-korea-sony-pictures-regin-gchq-nsa-snowden-belgacom http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/07/north-kore... The active attack can of course obtain enough information to decrypt the traffic automatically afterwards or even record it unencrypted. It appears that's the context of the SSH decryption in the documents.
- spacefight 12y agoWhen will you guys all wake up? GCHQ does the full take on the cables, and there is no document yet, that claims NSA doesn't. So, all your sessions are hosed at some point in time. Either now or in the future. And yes, sensationalize is sometimes necessary to get more folks onboard to work with the documents.
- dmix 12y agoSo what if they are stored? There has been a big shift towards using perfect-forward-secrecy as default in the last 18 months.
- spacefight 12y agoCan't you see the pattern? Take all, break the crypto later. PFS might be next, who knows. Yes, for now OTR and PGP is fine. There must be a big speculation on future breakthroughs regarding breaking crypto - otherwise they wouldn't build Bluffdale. Edit: Instead of downvoting, how about taking position?
- acqq 12y agoIt's not that the PFS is known to be broken, it's that it's actually still very rarely used (1) The present is problematic enough, we don't even need to hypothesize on the future breakages. 1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy "As of December 2014, 20.0% of TLS-enabled websites are configured to use cipher suites that provide forward secrecy to web browsers." IPSEC is also often configured with the disabled PFS, even if the RFC is from 1998 ( http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 )
- tptacek 12y ago"PFS might be next, who knows"? What does that even mean? OTR and TLS PFS are closely related.
- acqq 12y ago
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- sneak 12y agoIf Jake Appelbaum had any technical credibility, he would have claimed something other than a break in SSH for his talk. :(
- tete 12y agoYou might want to look at page 19 and 35: http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35515.pdf http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35515.pdf Did he actually say break?
- xorcist 12y agoNo, he did not say break in his talk. He said something along the lines of "at one point, the NSA mentions SSH together with SSL and IPsec as technologies which there are methods against" which could mean just about anything. They could break into the host and steal the host keys for example, without having to do costly cryptanalysis. But the moment he breathed SSH, pretty much all of IRC and the whole Saal 1 could not think of anything else. Everyone and their brother wanted to know what to use instead of SSH now that it's broken. It was a bit of panic in the air. My suggestion is to go to the leaked slide and make your own conclusions. There are among the most credible people we have behind openssh and the crypto primitives are used in a very straightforward way.
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoThey talk about decrypts of SSH tunnelling as a "potential", if they can later steal the keys. SSH, I note, does have an RSA-based key exchange as well as its usual Diffie-Hellman: if their targets have been using plain RSA, that would make an attacker's life easier for historical decrypts! Based on their typical methodology, I think that is probably what they are talking about, because they mention stealing IPsec pre-shared keys from router configurations in a very similar context. Of course, all we have is a probably - this selection of documents is not anywhere near as comprehensive as we'd perhaps like here. We're having to fill in the blanks - and there's too many blanks to fill in clearly. There seems to be relatively little in this leak from NSA's PICARESQUE/PIEDMONT, or GCHQ's STRAP3 (which covers specific operational details: purely by way of hypothetical example :-), where individual full-take feed taps actually are in Telehouse North, or specific details about SIGINT enabling via the Cavium Nitrox chips), sadly. Alternative ideas (or leaks!) are welcomed. Recent versions of OpenSSH have using some non-NIST primitives from djb, including Curve25519-SHA256 key exchange, Ed25519 keys and ChaCha20-Poly1305 transports. I am quite confident neither NSA nor GCHQ have any good cryptanalytic attacks against those primitives. There is mention of some exploitation against finite-field Diffie-Hellman in TLS (PHOENIX). That lacks context, however, and we can only guess about what's missing. One possibility is it's an active attack which tricks the peers into agreeing keys over an unsafe field (TLS 1.2 has no way to date for peers to suggest or agree on lists of named fields; however, the recent ffdhe draft does provide one) - however active attacks don't really fit the context under discussion in the slides. The TLS Working Group at IETF is currently discussing this, and a suggestion's been made to remove the old finite-field DHE transports due to their poor performance and apparent vulnerability, replacing them with ECDHE over secp256r1 (a NIST curve), and quite possibly in the near future X25519 over Curve25519 (a non-NIST curve). I don't know how that's going to resolve yet.
- glitchdout 12y agoIf I didn't know that the government is manipulating social media all the time, I totally would not think you're a shill trying to discredit these news reports by claiming that Jake Appelbaum is a non-technical journalist. * Revealed: US spy operation that manipulates social media (http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/mar/17/us-spy-operation-social-networks http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/mar/17/us-spy-ope...) * How Covert Agents Infiltrate The Internet To Manipulate, Deceive, And Destroy Reputations (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/ https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipula...)
- xnull2guest 12y agoReprising a relevant comment: The United States and allies do use the internet to spread Western culture and ideas, start revolutions, and kindle insurrection. The United States CIA attempted (and nearly succeeded) in inciting a revolution against Castro by pretending to be a series of grassroots movements on a Twitter-like platform and by inciting anti-administration feelings within the Cuban population. That was earlier this year. "USAID effort to undermine Cuban government with fake ‘Twitter’ another anti-Castro failure" [1] The United States has an ongoing effort to use Internet media to 'deradicalize' the next generation of Middle Easterners and actively manipulates public opinions in Jordan, Cairo, Syria and other Middle Eastern states. Here are some quotes from one DoD MINERVA paper: "...it is imperative that we develop empirically-based procedures for countering messages that promote violent extremism and anti-Western beliefs..." "...Neural predictors of Twitter impact in Cairo (UCLA & Egypt). Our prior work (Falk et al., 2012), indicates that neural responses of a small group can predict which persuasive messages will be more successful in mass media campaigns..." "... Defense Group Inc. already tracks Twitter trends specific to Egypt and will identify which of the selected Twitter topics went on to be highly influential over the next month and which did not..." - Matthew Lieberman, UCLA, September 30, 2012, Department of Defense MINERVA Initiative [2] Here's one US company that does it. MARAYA MEDIA - "Driving Intelligent Dialog". [3] The United States engages in targeted mass media and social manipulation to stir dissent in target nations, and to quell dissent where destabilization would hurt policy objectives. The DoD's MINERVA project specifically looks to understand the cultural components of stability of various countries and mechanisms to encourage or disrupt that stability. Among a great number of social studies you will find DoD research on how to seed information inside of specific Asian countries, including China, for the targeted introduction of instability. I will leave speculations of possible connections to the Hong Kong protests to the reader. [4] During the Iraq war US officials were known to detain Iraqi journalists and bloggers and force them to write articles in favor of the American efforts or to spread misinformation useful to ongoing campaigns. The CIA purposefully slipped misinformation into American media outlets to fool counterinsurgents who were reading American media (the infamous "Fallujah PysOp"). This should not come as a surprise given the history of the US: The United States and allies are known to target media in other countries to stir dissent. Radio Free Europe, "Voice of Iraq" (cough American), the Lincoln Group infiltrations and partnerships, etc. But now with global interconnectedness it is easy to set up 'foreign media', blogs and other politicizing content to influence other nations' populations. In the past decade it has become a global issue. This year Egypt sentenced Al Jazeera journalists that they believed were partnered with geopolitical interests of other states. Putin's administration is now requiring bloggers to register if they have a certain number of readers, so that his administration can curtail international influence. China blocks many American services including Facebook and Google. The usual story in America is that they are censoring free speech. The truth is that they do not want foreign influence to destabilize their population and that they do not want their citizen's data in America's PRISM program (there's a reason it's called the FISA "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act" court). The Snowden revelations showed us how intelligence agencies are involved in PsyOps - the term for 'psychological operations' used by the CIA and others. The GCHQ's BIRDSONG/BADGER/GATEWAY/SLIPSTREAM/ETC and partnership with the NSA are used to influence online polls, discussion forums and to vote up and down content that aligns with policy goals. [5][6][7] The giant meta-data graph created by the NSA is also particularly valuable for 'influencer' and 'social contagion' analysis (leaks showed they do use it to understand internal chain-of-command and organization structure for target selection). It's why metadata matters. A nice illustration of this is the article "Finding Paul Revere." And so we have issues here with the use of targeted social influence in America as well. First there are instances where other countries are trying to incite disruption in the US - the US wants to study and curtail it. [8] A number of journalists have called out that the state has been extremely aggressive to dissenting opinions, even to go so far as labeling current policy on the issue "War on Journalism". American officials have exported a number of journalists with Middle Eastern descent and journalists like Ayman Mohyeldin have been pulled from Gaza and other conflicts when reporting has erred on the side of other state interests. The crackdown on journalism is worth another post I don't have time to write. Just look at how central a role controlling internet dialog is for running a modern US presidency. A Google search for "Obama internet campaign" [9] results in headlines "How Obama's Internet Campaign Changed Politics", "How Obama won the internet", "Barack Obama and the Facebook Election", "Propelled by Internet, Barack Obama Wins Presidency" - this isn't because of grassroots discussion but because both Obama and McCain (and Romney before him) had cyber centers in control of internet PR engaging tens of millions of dollars in Twitter messages, etc. You can nudge public opinion by bombarding them with an influx of the same message, slightly disguised in one way and then another. The MINERVA program has plenty of good reading with regard to this. Anyway, the USG does this overseas and, to a limited degree (you decide how limited) presidential campaigns and journalistic partnerships (anyone want me to write a blurb on that...?) have them doing it inside the United States as well. [1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/usaid-effort-to-undermine-cuban-government-with-fake-twitter-another-anti-castro-failure/2014/04/03/c0142cc0-bb75-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/usaid-effort-t... [2] http://minerva.dtic.mil/doc/samplewp-Lieberman.pdf http://minerva.dtic.mil/doc/samplewp-Lieberman.pdf [3] http://www.marayamedia.com/company.php http://www.marayamedia.com/company.php [4] https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/ https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipula... [5] https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/ https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipula... [6] http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun... [7] http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/02/16/945768/-UPDATED-The-HB-Gary-Email-That-Should-Concern-Us-All http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/02/16/945768/-UPDATED-The... [8] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/truthy-project-is-unworthy-of-tax-dollars/2014/10/17/a3274faa-531b-11e4-809b-8cc0a295c773_story.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/truthy-project-is-unw... [9] https://www.google.com/?q=obama+internet+campaign https://www.google.com/?q=obama+internet+campaign Comment reprised from here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8709976 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8709976
- combrinator 12y agoNew attack against AES? - The Tau statistic: From the Spiegel article: "Electronic codebooks, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard, are both widely used and difficult to attack cryptanalytically. The NSA has only a handful of in-house techniques. The TUNDRA project investigated a potentially new technique -- the Tau statistic -- to determine its usefulness in codebook analysis."
- lstamour 12y agoRelated: https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/549328365422145537 https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/549328365422145537 And: http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/12/that-spiegel-nsa-story-is-nonsense.html http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/12/that-spiegel-nsa-story-is-... Which isn't to say the NSA isn't legitimately participating in IETF and taking such notes ... but that codenames can be taken out of context. ;-)
- rdl 12y agoThere isn't enough in those documents to really analyze. Apparently all the good malware info is going to be released "in a couple weeks".