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I find baring the law of the excluded middle an unnecessarily restrictive basis for logic... And that attitude combined with a long chain of reasoning will win
by btilly 12y ago
I find baring the law of the excluded middle an unnecessarily restrictive basis for logic...
And that attitude combined with a long chain of reasoning will wind up with you accepting that the following are entirely sensible statements.
"I accept that there exist real numbers which cannot ever be specified."
"I accept that there exists a reasonable computer science problem for which there exists a polynomial time algorithm but for which I cannot ever prove any algorithm correct."
If you do accept them as reasonable, it is worth carefully considering what the word "exists" actually means to you, and how someone else might think it should mean something different. IF you come to the conclusion that it should mean something different than what is implied by those statements, then you should take another look at constructivism. :-)
- maaku 12y agoThere does exist real numbers that cannot be specified in (finite) space or time...
- sukilot 12y agoThis is what btilly is talking about. To parahrase: "there exist entities that cannot ever be constructed or named in any Universe like ours"
- btilly 12y agoAccording to classical mathematics, this is true. I can make the statement even stronger. There are real numbers which not only cannot be specified, but are strongly not compressible. That is, for the first n digits, there is no significantly more efficient way to specify what they are than to just list them. But we are now talking about the existence of something that cannot be specified or written down in any useful way, shape, or form. What does it actually mean to say that this exists? We've demonstrated that no direct evidence of existence can ever be found. This is pretty much the opposite of what a lot of people would actually want "existence" to mean. From a classical point of view what is wrong is your notion of existence. But it is perfectly reasonable to instead conclude that it is classical mathematics which has gone off the rails and they are now using words like "existence" in a nonsensical way. Both points of view are perfectly defensible. In fact it was proven by Goedel that any inconsistency in one leads to an inconsistency in the other. Therefore neither is actually able to claim to have a better grounding in logical consistency than the other. Historically the debate was that classical mathematics is more convenient to work with, while constructivism actually means something more reasonable. But once the set paradoxes faded, and with no difference in consistency, the simplicity of classical mathematics won.
- darkmighty 12y agoSo what's constructivism useful for anyway? Why change the basis of logic instead of proving non-constructability within the reasonable existing logics? (E.g. prove a real number isn't constructable instead of foregoing it's existence) There are also cases of interest beyond constructivism: what if a number is non-constructible but can be approximated? Saying it doesn't exist doesn't sound particularly useful.
- btilly 12y agoSo what's constructivism useful for anyway? Not much. The philosophy of math is not noted for being particularly useful. :-) That said, historically constructivism arose during a period when math was having trouble creating solid foundations. Today we can talk about "the reasonable existing logics". But a century ago you couldn't. Attempts to create such a thing had repeatedly resulted in paradoxes, and an inability to find solid foundations had caused repeated mathematical crises for a century. In that light, it was reasonable to doubt lines of reasoning that proved the existence of things in infinite sets but provided no way to actually find them. This smelled too much of the kinds of things that had lead to paradox. Hence the appeal of a philosophy that insisted that things are only known to exist when we have constructions for them. Proofs are only valid when they follow lines of reasoning that can, at least in principle, actually be followed in finite time. These days this is mostly a historical footnote. But an important one. There are also cases of interest beyond constructivism: what if a number is non-constructible but can be approximated? Um, actually a constructivist would say that that number exists. To understand, you have to ask what a real number is. One definition of a real number is a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers. Which is to say an infinite series of rational numbers that converges. Constructivists make this more precise. Rather than talking about an infinite series of rational numbers, they talk about a algorithm that generates a series of rational numbers. Rather than saying "for every epsilon greater than 0 there exists an N..." they insist that there is an algorithm which can take in epsilon and spit out N. Combining these two, from a valid specification of a real number, you can generate an algorithm that given an epsilon > 0 can generate a rational number within epsilon of the real number. And an algorithm that does that can easily be turned into a Cauchy sequence. Thus to a constructivist, being able to approximate a number arbitrarily well is perfectly fine as a definition of said number. Things get odd in that you can have two different constructions of real numbers but you don't always know whether they are specifying the same number. But you quickly get used to this. Saying it doesn't exist doesn't sound particularly useful. Let me turn that around. What is the use of asserting the existence of things that you cannot construct? What are you going to do with something that you cannot find in an infinite haystack? A thing that may be impossible to find, even in principle?