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Can we effectively model the system with all its interacting components in the language of strategies and payoff-maximization? For a certain set of scenarios p
by danbruc 12y ago
Can we effectively model the system with all its interacting components in the language of strategies and payoff-maximization?
For a certain set of scenarios probably but what if the goal of an attacker is, for example, the destruction of Bitcoin? I don't think you can capture motivation for such a scenario in a model that, as far as I understand it, is based on value maximization within the Bitcoin system. The negative effect of any action within the system can always be offset by some positive effect outside the system. So I don't think it is a good idea to decide what metric should be used to judge the behavior of actors if you want to analyze attacks.
- randomwalker 12y agoThat's a good question. One of the points I'll make in the follow-up post that I promised is that it is indeed possible to capture the motivation of such an attacker in game theory, and in fact, this has been done. [1] However, it makes the model less elegant and introduces parameters. The more of these complexities you wish to model, the less tractable the model becomes. [1] http://weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf http://weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2... (Section 5).
- jaekwon 12y agoI think that's the paper that Eyal & Sirer disprove with "selfish mining". And here's a post that may provide a useful mental framework for thinking about cryptocurrency consensus protocols and game-theory: http://tendermint.com/posts/security-of-cryptocurrency-protocols/ http://tendermint.com/posts/security-of-cryptocurrency-proto... And a proposed solution: http://tendermint.com/docs/tendermint.pdf http://tendermint.com/docs/tendermint.pdf Also, check out the email invite I sent you to the group! p.s. if anybody wants access, just email me.