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In my PERSONAL opinion, I see the canary as something saying "this is the last time we were known secure". If it gets updated, then things are fine. If this wer
by StavrosK 12y ago
In my PERSONAL opinion, I see the canary as something saying "this is the last time we were known secure". If it gets updated, then things are fine. If this weren't the intended use, they'd have archiving systems so you could go back and see if someone missed an update.
Then again, I don't know if the US can make you lie and coerce you to sign the canary. If so, then what you say makes sense.
- jacquesm 12y agohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary "If the canary has not been updated in the time period specified by the host, users are to assume that the host has been served with such a subpoena." That seems pretty clear to me.
- StavrosK 12y agoSure. The question is what happens when it starts getting updated again. If a LEA can't force you to update it, the only reasonable explanation is that there was an unrelated failure in updating it, and that everything is fine after all.
- jacquesm 12y agoWhen it gets updated again users are still to be under the assumption that you have received a warrant or NSL. That's the whole idea. I fear we're going around in circles here.
- StavrosK 12y agoIf you trust canaries AT ALL, you trust that an LEA can't make the owner sign it under duress. Otherwise they don't work, since the owner could just be forced to sign it without missing any window. Then, it stands to reason that if the canary gets updated again, you trust that everything is fine again, and that the owner didn't get served with an NSL. Therefore, it follows that if you trust canaries at all, you cannot stop trusting them if they fail to be updated for a time, except for that specific duration. Please correct me if my reasoning is wrong anywhere.
- jacquesm 12y agoThe failure modes of canaries are safe because they die, the fragility is the whole point. Once dead they tend to stay dead. If you then prop up the canary afterwards and say it wasn't really dead, we just forgot to feed it for three weeks you're risking credibility at a minimum. So either the operator is incompetent (which makes them a bad choice for trusting them with critical data) or the canary is now potentially under control of another party. The problem I have with the whole setup is less one of whether or not this is a 'fixable' issue and we should redefine warrant canaries and give them a re-incarnation option, it's that if you think the chances of getting slapped with a NSL or warrant are large enough to have a canary system to begin with that you're dealing with customers that are - or should be - paranoid enough that any tampering with the system other than behavior as explicitly stated up-front should be un-acceptable. Otherwise it becomes a question of where do we draw the line? A few weeks, a month or a year, what point is there to feed the canary at all if you can revive it at some arbitrary point in the future. After all the canary is a channel with very specific conditions attached to it, it now seems as though you are trying to redefine those conditions after the fact and that is the one property a thing like a warrant canary does not have. If silent circle would have stated up front we will feed the canary weekly + a potential month in which we will take a holiday and everything is fine, otherwise we have been served with a warrant then you could call this operating within allowed parameters. But I don't think you should be able to tack on such a clause afterwards.
- gburt 12y agoNot if the text of the canary is "we have NEVER received." That is the point. Otherwise intra-period of updating you wouldn't know either.
- jacquesm 12y agoBut you'd still be in defined territory. Once you let the canary send out its signal any conditions you attach after that fact contradict the signal by design and that is exactly the way it is not intended to work. You set it up with a set of rules and then you stick to those rules. The intra-period but within defined parameters risk is a different one from the post canary has given its signal one. The way I understand the whole system to work is that you set up a fragile, fusible link that will blow exactly once to give its signal, and any further signals are suspect. Otherwise why agree on a protocol to begin with if you can then break that protocol at will? I can see a case for changing the protocol assuming the previous one was not broken but once you violate the protocol I can't see a way to un-do that without making the whole concept meaningless as a result.
- tptacek 12y ago'DannyBee, who is a lawyer, has written comments on HN that pretty convincingly rebut the idea that the USG could make you lie on their behalf. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6586812#up_6587254 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6586812#up_6587254
- StavrosK 12y agoAh, thanks. Yeah, then it stands to reason that if a canary gets updated, things are fine. As I commented on a sibling, if the USG could compel you to lie, canaries would be completely useless as a concept.
- jacquesm 12y ago> Yeah, then it stands to reason that if a canary gets updated, things are fine. I don't think that conclusion is warranted. If the canary gets updated it could be any one of a number of things, one of which is that things are fine. But saying that the canary being updated is the same as you being compelled to lie misses out on a few critical options: - presumably you set the time interval between updates short enough that your key or passphrase could not be compromised in that timeframe, so any interval longer may indicate a compromised private key - it's only fine if the canary specs as defined up-front have not been violated (which in this case they have) - canaries may be useless as a concept anyway because lawyers are human and hence fallible. (That last one is a stretch, but with stuff like this it's either 1 or 0, not something in between and I don't see an iron clad guarantee there, merely an informed opinion.)
- gburt 12y agoThis is my understanding too. Real canaries die in the wild for reasons unrelated to the signal it intends to send. The canary in this case is basically a date of claim.