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"Homo economicus, is a creature of coldly calculated selfishness, dispassionately maximizing its best interests even if that comes at the expense of others." F
by jerf 12y ago
"Homo economicus, is a creature of coldly calculated selfishness, dispassionately maximizing its best interests even if that comes at the expense of others."
For the second time today, I get to point out that in economics is neutral about "best interests" and is metaphorically happy to accommodate people whom consider happiness or other such "soft" things as part of their personal value function. If your definition of "homo economicus" is a psycopath... well, you're the one who stuck a psychopath there, so ultimately this is a circular argument in which one asserts that economics is based on the idea of a psychopath that you put there in the first place. Not exactly a surprising result there.
There is absolutely no contradiction between "most people act in what they believe to be their best interests" and "most people take care of their family", because obviously most people consider "taking care of their family" to be in their "best interests".
Homo Economicus is still a fictional being, but it's not because "not everyone is a psychopath", it's because not everyone is perfectly rational all the time, and humans do have some weaknesses on the rationality front. It was (and really is) a good approximation because on the whole, people do act amusingly rationally in a surprising array of situations. (I say "amusing" because they will often act perfectly rationally in some circumstance, then cite as their reason some astonishing bullshit reason. Nevertheless, their actions are often quite rational.)
It's still supposed to be "Homo Economicus" and not "Robo Economicus" or "Vulcan Economicus".
- Symmetry 12y agoExactly. The only assumptions that economics makes about people are that (1) people have different utility functions and (2) that they rationally pursue them. (1) is satisfied even if everybody is perfectly selfless just as much as if they're perfectly selfish, it's only if everybody was a perfect utilitarian that it would break down. (2) is much more tenuous but usually works well enough when you're dealing with large number of people who can try different strategies and adjust their approaches depending on the success of their friends and neighbors.
- Gimpei 12y agoThey make a lot more assumptions than that, neoclassical economists at least. How do you think they manage to aggregate the preferences of millions of people to provide "microfoundations" to their models? See the aggregation problem on wikipedia.
- alexbecker 12y agoI think (1) is a tenuous assumption as well, especially in some formalizations. Cardinal utility (the idea that it makes sense to say "I want X lambda times as much as I want Y") is almost certainly bunk. Even assuming a total ordering seems unlikely.
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- cmdkeen 12y agoGeorge Price created a mathematical theory that altruism works with game theory in evolutionary terms. In an attempt to prove the theory either way he adopted increasingly altruistic behaviour and become more religiously devout. He ended up broke having given away all his possessions, becoming depressed due to the number of times he was taken advantage of. He killed himself in 1975. His atheist colleague converted to Christianity. There are plenty of ways to interpret the models that economists create - if the Price equation can model altruism in terms of game theory, you're perfectly correct that the definition of "best interests" is a variable.
- dropit_sphere 12y agoThank you very much for turning me on to Price. That's a fascinating story.
- DanDanDanDan 12y agoMost people do not take care of their family because they think it's in their best interests. They often take care of their family for myriad reasons--e.g. a moral call to selflessness, sociocultural norms, a sense of familial duty, love, etc. The language of "best interests" really doesn't fit here. Taking care of an ailing parent is in no way connected to maximizing one's returns on anything (except maybe fulfilling a sense of what you "ought" to do).
- alexbecker 12y agoYou're missing his point. "Interests" is a technical term in economics which means something different from the common usage. In short, it means things you consciously seek for their own value. Love, being moral, fulfilling duties; all of these are interests in the sense economists use the term. NB: Economists largely study specifically monetary interest because it's something they can measure. A number of criticisms can be made about this, but there isn't a good alternative.
- dragonwriter 12y ago> Economists largely study specifically monetary interest because it's something they can measure. A principle assumption of many of the models underlying economic theories (including, but not limited to, rational choice theory) is that there is a unidimensional quantity, "utility", that aggregates a persons preferences and which individual decisions increase or decrease by definable amounts. Because money is widely fungible, and utility cannot be measured directly, money (e.g., the money people are willing to pay to get something they want, or the money they demand to do or give up something) is often used as a proxy for utility by economists, with the idea that all decisions have an (potentially zero) utility impact, and that utility impact can be stated in monetary terms.
- alexbecker 12y agoI'm familiar with utility functions, although I think they don't accurately reflect people's values; I think people's values more closely resemble a poset. But even assuming a cardinal utility function, we run into the problem that money isn't all that widely fungible. I cannot buy friends, family, love, legal or social reform, etc., all of which must weigh heavily in many people's utility functions.
- clairity 12y agoeconomists (particularly of the capitalist variety) certainly have a point of view that the economic utility function can be directly transformed into and represented by monetary value. literally the point of the utility function is to represent behavioral preferences with a number, which can then be calculated on. by turning decisions into math, this transformation has the effect of shielding rational actors from the emotional consequences of their actions. for example, this is why an interaction with a large (inter-)national bank is often very different from the local credit union. a credit union may give you a break on fees or on check clearing times because they see you standing in front of them in need and they're sympathetic to your situation, but at a major bank, policy decisions are made in private offices far from contact with everyday customers and are simplified into a cold hard calculation about how much profit can be extracted from you. also i'd posit that not only are humans sometimes not rational, but that humans are commonly irrational. rationality derives from a useful simplification of the world that helped us survive against bigger, faster & stronger animals. we've stretched rationality marvelously to make it a useful model of a wide range of relatively simpler macro-phenomena. but it's a poor model for complex actors like people, who exhibit a much wider degree of freedom and range of action. rationality necessarily assumes that a single best choice can be made in any situation (rarely, two or more choices might be equivalently good but that's not relevant here) and that all relevant factors can be incorporated into that single decision. this is almost never the case in real life, except maybe in the problem sets assigned in school. it's as likely that a rational model is designed to coincide with the center of a distribution of decisions made by real people, as it is that the model has explanatory power about that distribution. people are incorporating an astonishingly vast array of information in their decision-making that is very unlikely to be considered by a rational economic model, so those "astonishing bullshit reasons" shouldn't be so surprising really if you don't conflate the modeled behavior of the population with that of the individuals.
- nickff 12y ago>"economists (particularly of the capitalist variety) certainly have a point of view that the economic utility function can be directly transformed into and represented by monetary value" Which economists have that point of view? Some have accused Smith of this, but it is plainly untrue, as made clear in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments".[1] Austrian economists such as Mises (who few would call socialist) criticized even the cardinal utility model, and argued that only lists of ordinal utilities are useful.[2] [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Theory_of_Moral_Sentiments http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Theory_of_Moral_Sentiments [2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Theory_of_Money_and_Credit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Theory_of_Money_and_Credit
- lukifer 12y agoHomo Economicus might be fictional, but Corpo Economicus and Beaureau Econonomicus are not. Whenever individuals must make decisions on behalf of organizations (public or private), they must be able to justify their actions in the rational, sometimes psychopathic, terms of their institution (to make legible decisions, to use Venkatesh Rao's terminology). Though economics is value-neutral when it comes to what individuals define as their best interests, institutions have their best interests defined quite explicitly, and are often indifferent to any other outcome. Applying the rational actor model to such institutions provides a great deal of cover, if not active encouragement, for maximizing the acquisition of power and resources with little regard for the irrational human processes of morality, responsibility and decency.
- hdhriek 12y agoExactly. And where you have a society dominated by entities acting entirely in their self interest you are likely to get instability. Society formed through the complex interplay between selfishness and altruism. An individual in the evolutionary sense is not merely contained within the physical body he inhabits, but is spread among a group of people who share, in part, the genes that describe him. As such the individuals within a genetically related grouping behave at times in a manner beneficial to the common good. This allows the machinations of society to grow in complexity over time. It allows more optimal configurations in the phase space of society to be sought out. Without this interdependence between actors, you fall foul of extreme short termism. We have pure rational self interest on a pedestal and ignored the altruism component for various historical reasons. We find ourselves in a dynamic which is destructive to the pursuit of globally optimal configurations of society.