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But taking on the role of arm-chair rogue nation, why? I can image three reasons. First as I mentioned above, you might make official denials with the understa
by sopooneo 12y ago
But taking on the role of arm-chair rogue nation, why?
I can image three reasons. First as I mentioned above, you might make official denials with the understanding that everyone assumes you did it anyway. Second, there might be internal infighting between the people who did it and the people who issued the denial. Or third, you might do it with the plan to take credit, then get cold feet afterwards when you realize how much heat it's bringing down, and then deny.
Or is there any other hypothetical rational for such acts that I am missing?
- ncallaway 12y agoAnother rationale is that you want the attack to happen, but you don't want negative repercussions for being the actor that caused it. This is essentially the first scenario you present. The Cheonan incident followed a very similar path. S Korea and the United States identified N Korea as the actor. N Korea denied the involvement and offered to work with the nations to lead an open investigation into the incident. N Korea's official denial was enough cover for China and Russia to disagree that N Korea was involved in the incident. The ultimate UN statement on the attack was a condemnation of the attack, but no official party was declared responsible. This gives N Korea the benefit of terrorizing the S Korean navy, while avoiding a direct military or economic response. It's a game of brinksmanship where they want to push their actions as far as possible to convince the world that their threats are serious, while still minimizing the negative repercussions that often follow from such actions.
- crdoconnor 12y ago>This gives N Korea the benefit of terrorizing the S Korean navy, while avoiding a direct military or economic response. They've frequently done similar attacks and been completely open about it and suffered not much in the way of a response. >This gives N Korea the benefit of terrorizing the S Korean navy, while avoiding a direct military or economic response. It's a game of brinksmanship where they want to push their actions as far as possible to convince the world that their threats are serious, while still minimizing the negative repercussions that often follow from such actions. Alternatively there was an almighty fuck up on the part of some part of the South Korean navy and blaming the North Koreans helped them escape any fallout.