4 ms·
That's not the point. The point is that you don't want to stand on only one leg when a flaw in that leg may be discovered in the future. Admittedly MD5 was a
by moe 12y ago
That's not the point.
The point is that you don't want to stand on only one leg when a flaw in that leg may be discovered in the future.
Admittedly MD5 was a poor example from me in that light...
A more realistic mix might be: sha256+RIPEMD160+Whirlpool.
Or, in crypto-speak: Concatenating outputs from multiple hash functions provides collision resistance as good as the strongest of the algorithms included in the concatenated result. [1]
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function#Concatenation_of_cryptographic_hash_functions http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function#Con...
- lmm 12y agoEven a very serious attack against SHA-512 would be unlikely to render it as weak as RIPEMD-160 (compare even e.g. MD4, which is pretty thoroughly broken but the attacks still take compute time). If you have the bits, it's better to spend them on a longer hash rather than more hashes.
- moe 12y agoEven a very serious attack against SHA-512 would What makes you think you can predict the consequences of an attack against SHA-512? Don't put all your eggs in one basket.
- lmm 12y ago> What makes you think you can predict the consequences of an attack against SHA-512? 70 years of cryptographic history. > Don't put all your eggs in one basket. Don't use cryptographic primitives in ways they weren't designed for. That's a surefire recipe for disaster.