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It's unfortunate that Backblaze feels the need to transfer the private key to their servers. Their knowledge base entry at https://help.backblaze.com/entries/2
by Tepix 12y ago
It's unfortunate that Backblaze feels the need to transfer the private key to their servers.
Their knowledge base entry at https://help.backblaze.com/entries/20203731-Can-you-tell-me-more-about-the-encryption-Backblaze-uses- https://help.backblaze.com/entries/20203731-Can-you-tell-me-... doesn't clarify wether or not the secret private password is transmitted to their servers to decrypt the private keys there which would make the scheme rather weak.
Ideally, the private keys would remain on the user's PCs.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- foldor 12y agoWhile I do agree that private keys and transparency is important, I feel they almost need to store the private keys as well. But they should be password protected by something only the user knows, and the password shouldn't need to be transmitted over to their servers. The reason they would need the private keys should be obvious. They are a data disaster recovery service. In the event of a disaster where all of your drives fail, or are inaccessible you would still need access to your data. So if the only copy of the private key isn't on their servers you would be shit out of luck, not exactly a good situation for a company like theirs. But yeah, store the private key, but make it encrypted by a secure password only decrypted locally, and update documentation to make this clear.
- twoodfin 12y agoBut yeah, store the private key, but make it encrypted by a secure password only decrypted locally, and update documentation to make this clear. I think even this is "too secure". I forget my 'secure passwords' regularly, and I'm sure I wouldn't be the only one. It's not a huge improvement over telling a user to print out a private key and keep it somewhere safe. Given the likely threats to Backblaze, I'd encrypt user backup private keys with a threshold or other multi-key scheme. No individual Backblaze employee's key would be sufficient to decrypt a backup; you'd need the active participation (and private knowledge) of at least a few. That prevents individuals from snooping, and requires compromising several employees to decrypt backup data.
- gh02t 12y agoIncidentally, if anybody is looking for a way to set up keys like twoodfin is describing, you might want to look at ssss. It's an implementation of Shamir's secret sharing scheme and works quite nicely for me. http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss/ http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss/
- brianwski 12y agoBackblaze engineer here. The private encryption key is a completely standard PEM file from OpenSSL. We have two modes: by default the PEM file is secured by a "pass phrase" known by Backblaze. In this lower security mode, the user data is essentially only secured by their email address and their chosen password on the Backblaze website, and the user can recover their password via email. That is a great mode if you are just backing up stuff you don't terribly mind somebody getting a copy - like photos of your cat. If you are concerned about security, the second mode is you set your own "pass phrase" on the PEM file. But oh my lord, make sure you remember that pass phrase because Backblaze never writes it to disk and if you forget it, NOBODY ON EARTH is getting your files. Not you, not the USA government, not Backblaze, that data is GONE. You cannot recover that password. This is a good security mode if you would be arrested if the NSA got a copy of your data, because we don't think it can be broken.
- bumbledraven 12y agoEven in "secure mode", your passphrase must be sent to backblaze's servers whenever you do a restore. They then have posession of decrypted version of your files for a while. This is unacceptable. As brianwski wrote in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8169040 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8169040: ...[I]f you lose a file, you have to sign into the Backblaze website and provide your passphrase which is ONLY STORED IN RAM for a few seconds and your file is decrypted. Yes, you are now in a "vulnerable state" until you download then "delete" the restore at which point you are back to a secure state.