Yes. There need to be wholesale architectural changes as well. If there's a convincing argument that a monolithic kernel can be made secure, I haven't seen it.

Yes. There need to be wholesale architectural changes as well. If there's a convincing argument that a monolithic kernel can be made secure, I haven't seen it. Device drivers are simply too dangerous to be running in kernel space, for example, along with much of the rest of what we usually get in the kernel (filesystems, TCP and UDP stacks, etc). No binary should ever be run without the kernel imposing an appropriately restrictive set of policies on what it can do. And there needs to be more sophistication in approaching how applications work. For example, a good argument can be made that binaries shouldn't be allowed to open their own file handles under most conditions. Your word processor shouldn't be the one putting up an open dialog and opening anything you point to in your directory tree because that's how it can be talked into dumping your entire home directory to a foreign server. It should have to ask the OS to put that dialog up, and then accept the file handle(s) it's handed by the OS. And then there are protocols that are broken by design, which we haven't even touched on. Everything, from top to bottom, needs to be rewritten with security in mind. Not sure how that could realistically happen, unfortunately.