Examples like the ones you give are the best way I know to point out that risk is a component of value, too. The governance wonk's answer is that shareholders

Examples like the ones you give are the best way I know to point out that risk is a component of value, too. The governance wonk's answer is that shareholders should elect board members who will guide management to the risk profile they desire from the investment ... or sell to fund purchases of alternative securities better aligned with their needs. This poses all kinds of real-world problems, from ensuring that management doesn't adopt its own preferred risk profile (where that differs from shareholders'), to the relative costs of organizing many smaller block holders, on the one hand, and consolidated institutional investors, on the other, to the existence (or non-existence) of liquidity and alternative investments. That line of thinking leads to lots of hard questions about how micro-level market and governance structures play out in the large, as well as the extent to which small-scale investors can organize or consolidate interests (say, via funds) and stay true to their interests as scale.