> Taking away the A10 to feed the JSF program is like deleting txt files to get hard disk space back. Sure, but A-10 is one of only many txt files USAF is tryi

> Taking away the A10 to feed the JSF program is like deleting txt files to get hard disk space back. Sure, but A-10 is one of only many txt files USAF is trying to delete so they can defragment. > > doesn't deter conflict against extremists (who are not deterrable by the same military calculus in any event), > Right, so, why mention it? Because it demonstrates that A-10 provides just as much value-add in the deterrence equation (i.e., none at all) that other weapons platforms in the U.S. inventory do. > I don't know where the AC130 were but the helicopters didn't want any part of it. The A10 pilots were all like "I'll go draw some fire while you look for 'em." You can't do that in a helicopter. It's a pity the Army got rid of Kiowa, their pilots were precisely crazy enough to do that kind of thing, "armored bathtub" or not. Either way, no one is saying that A-10 provides nothing at all above other platforms (my comment you replied to acknowledges as much). Rather, the argument is that the cost of maintaining A-10 and its entire associated long tail of maintenance, sustainment, training pipelines, etc., does not provide enough marginal benefit to warrant its price tag.