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> It's not a good plane to fight the hypothetical wars against adversaries that the US might never engage on the battlefield. More to the point, it is taking a
by mpyne 12y ago
> It's not a good plane to fight the hypothetical wars against adversaries that the US might never engage on the battlefield.
More to the point, it is taking away resources to field the planes that would be needed for that hypothetical fight against an adversary with a modern military. Worse, the inability of the U.S. military to fight and win against states with modern militaries makes war more likely, not less likely.
While the A-10 is certainly a good CAS platform against armed forces unable to oppose it with even 20-year old anti-air defenses, the U.S. does have other aircraft that can perform that role (even if not to the standard as the A-10). Between the AC-130, Army helicopter aviation, F-15, -16, -22 and -35, there's no lack of capability to put ordnance on target in support of ground troops.
The big thing those airframes are missing (except for the helos and AC-130) is loiter time and cannons that go "brrrpt", but neither of those are so critical to CAS as is popularly implied.
In other words, the USAF is arguing against maintaining a weapon system that doesn't deter conflict against states one iota, doesn't deter conflict against extremists (who are not deterrable by the same military calculus in any event), and whose most prominent capability isn't that much of a leap ahead of other platforms the USAF (and US Army) already have to maintain and field anyways.
Although it can certainly kill people, the A-10 was designed to hunt and destroy Soviet tanks, and yet you don't see too many tanks being fielded by ISIS (even with the Iraqi tanks they've captured, they don't have the logistical or maintenance capabilities needed to properly employ them).
- fnordfnordfnord 12y agoTaking away the A10 to feed the JSF program is like deleting txt files to get hard disk space back. >In other words, the USAF is arguing against maintaining a weapon system that doesn't deter conflict against states one iota, None of that other garbage deterred any conflict. >doesn't deter conflict against extremists (who are not deterrable by the same military calculus in any event), Right, so, why mention it? > and whose most prominent capability isn't that much of a leap ahead of other platforms the USAF (and US Army) already have to maintain and field anyways. [x] Can draw enemy fire while wingman locates attackers. Not a capability of any other aircraft in the stable. Thanks to another poster (tim333) we have yet another recent example of an A10 actually doing a job like that, which no other group would do. http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/466762/bagram-pilots-save-60-soldiers-during-convoy-ambush.aspx http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/4667... I don't know where the AC130 were but the helicopters didn't want any part of it. The A10 pilots were all like "I'll go draw some fire while you look for 'em." You can't do that in a helicopter.
- mpyne 12y ago> Taking away the A10 to feed the JSF program is like deleting txt files to get hard disk space back. Sure, but A-10 is one of only many txt files USAF is trying to delete so they can defragment. > > doesn't deter conflict against extremists (who are not deterrable by the same military calculus in any event), > Right, so, why mention it? Because it demonstrates that A-10 provides just as much value-add in the deterrence equation (i.e., none at all) that other weapons platforms in the U.S. inventory do. > I don't know where the AC130 were but the helicopters didn't want any part of it. The A10 pilots were all like "I'll go draw some fire while you look for 'em." You can't do that in a helicopter. It's a pity the Army got rid of Kiowa, their pilots were precisely crazy enough to do that kind of thing, "armored bathtub" or not. Either way, no one is saying that A-10 provides nothing at all above other platforms (my comment you replied to acknowledges as much). Rather, the argument is that the cost of maintaining A-10 and its entire associated long tail of maintenance, sustainment, training pipelines, etc., does not provide enough marginal benefit to warrant its price tag.