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I wouldn't trust the data on a hard drive anyway, since the hard drive can be removed and the data changed. If you want to make sure you're reading _your_ /etc
by jrockway 12y ago
I wouldn't trust the data on a hard drive anyway, since the hard drive can be removed and the data changed. If you want to make sure you're reading _your_ /etc/shadow, it needs a message authentication code. If you want to prevent others from reading your disk, it needs to be encrypted.
- mnw21cam 12y agoMost people would regard a hard drive that they have received from somewhere and formatted themselves as safe. This hack shows that this is not necessarily the case.
- schoen 12y agoThere is a developing theme about how parts of a PC can avoid trusting other parts of the PC. For example, the PrivateCore folks (whose company was later acquired by Facebook) were describing a wide range of attacks where one part of your PC attacks another. https://privatecore.com/solution-overview/attacks/index.html https://privatecore.com/solution-overview/attacks/index.html (That page is mostly focused on someone coming into your data center and seizing or tampering with your device, but they've also talked about the idea of counterfeit or backdoored hardware components, and they do allude to that a bit there.) I find this kind of sad, because it adds overhead (for people designing systems, for people building and setting up systems, for people administering systems, and in terms of computational and memory overhead) and maybe reduces flexibility, but it seems like a well-justified threat model.