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A “Complex” Theory of Consciousness

33 points by akbarnama 12y ago

andybak 12y ago
It seems to me that at least a weak form of panpsychism seems hard to avoid without giving yourself much bigger metaphysical problems elsewhere.
TheSpiceIsLife 12y ago
It has been suggested that consciousness is an emergent property of complex systems. Maybe that should be written as: consciousness is an emergent property of integrated complex systems. Anyone around these parts familiar with the work of Ken Wilber?[1] He wrote a lot about 'Integral Psychology' and the like. At a glance IIT appears to fit nicely in the framework Wilber et al. expound. 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_Wilber http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_Wilber
gone35 12y ago
(Please add (2009) to the title) See [1] for a much more recent discussion. Basically, Scott Aaronson showed that some rather mundane-seeming systems (like, say, an ASIC implementing some LDPC code, or even just a square grid of XOR gates) exhibit very high "information integration" \Phi under this definition, and so would have to be highly conscious according to the theory. Tononi agrees, and argues we have to change our preconceived notions because that Reed-Solomon hardware in your DVD player is indeed highly conscious. Apparently. You be the judge. And keep that in mind before throwing away your old DVD player. [1] http://sciencehouse.wordpress.com/2014/06/02/integrated-information-theory/ http://sciencehouse.wordpress.com/2014/06/02/integrated-info...
- wslh 12y ago
  It feels like the old theory that all the elements are composed by water, fire, air, and earth.
tjbrennan 12y ago
This sounds like Functionalism to me. Until we can actually map out the complexity being described in the article, consciousness is still a philosophical problem. I appreciate the scientific approach, but I think Tononi's definition of consciousness is flawed (or just nonexistent). I've seen other attempts to apply science to the mind-body problem, and it yielded flat-out pseudoscience. This was not convincing either.
sewercake 12y ago
Just computational functionalism disguised under more complex analysis/definition. Information does not have meaning in and of itself; it requires an external, subjective observer to make it meaningful. Without meaning (or intentionality), then something sure as hell can't be conscious. If any of y'all are interested in a fresh take on the mind-body problem and the study of consciousness as a whole, check out Varela, Thompson and Rosch's The Embodied Mind (http://www.amazon.ca/The-Embodied-Mind-Cognitive-Experience/dp/0262720213 http://www.amazon.ca/The-Embodied-Mind-Cognitive-Experience/...). It presents an interesting alternative to the computational paradigm that has provided little insight into understanding consciousness, and as many would argue, has been debunked entirely by Searle's Chinese room thought-experiment. it is also a FANTASTIC introduction to the limitations and problems with our current scientific model.

33 points by akbarnama 12y ago

It seems to me that at least a weak form of panpsychism seems hard to avoid without giving yourself much bigger metaphysical problems elsewhere.

TheSpiceIsLife 12y ago

It has been suggested that consciousness is an emergent property of complex systems. Maybe that should be written as: consciousness is an emergent property of integrated complex systems. Anyone around these parts familiar with the work of Ken Wilber?[1] He wrote a lot about 'Integral Psychology' and the like. At a glance IIT appears to fit nicely in the framework Wilber et al. expound. 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_Wilber http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_Wilber

gone35 12y ago

(Please add (2009) to the title) See [1] for a much more recent discussion. Basically, Scott Aaronson showed that some rather mundane-seeming systems (like, say, an ASIC implementing some LDPC code, or even just a square grid of XOR gates) exhibit very high "information integration" \Phi under this definition, and so would have to be highly conscious according to the theory. Tononi agrees, and argues we have to change our preconceived notions because that Reed-Solomon hardware in your DVD player is indeed highly conscious. Apparently. You be the judge. And keep that in mind before throwing away your old DVD player. [1] http://sciencehouse.wordpress.com/2014/06/02/integrated-information-theory/ http://sciencehouse.wordpress.com/2014/06/02/integrated-info...

wslh 12y ago
It feels like the old theory that all the elements are composed by water, fire, air, and earth.

tjbrennan 12y ago

This sounds like Functionalism to me. Until we can actually map out the complexity being described in the article, consciousness is still a philosophical problem. I appreciate the scientific approach, but I think Tononi's definition of consciousness is flawed (or just nonexistent). I've seen other attempts to apply science to the mind-body problem, and it yielded flat-out pseudoscience. This was not convincing either.

sewercake 12y ago

Just computational functionalism disguised under more complex analysis/definition. Information does not have meaning in and of itself; it requires an external, subjective observer to make it meaningful. Without meaning (or intentionality), then something sure as hell can't be conscious. If any of y'all are interested in a fresh take on the mind-body problem and the study of consciousness as a whole, check out Varela, Thompson and Rosch's The Embodied Mind (http://www.amazon.ca/The-Embodied-Mind-Cognitive-Experience/dp/0262720213 http://www.amazon.ca/The-Embodied-Mind-Cognitive-Experience/...). It presents an interesting alternative to the computational paradigm that has provided little insight into understanding consciousness, and as many would argue, has been debunked entirely by Searle's Chinese room thought-experiment. it is also a FANTASTIC introduction to the limitations and problems with our current scientific model.